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FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District Lodge 15, International
Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case Nos. 81K/26911
and 81K/26912

and
The Hertz Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract by subcontracting the general cleaning of the interior of its vehicles? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 25, 1982 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argumen
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The disputed work is the major cleaning and shampooing of
the interior of the Company's cars and buses.
The Union claims that this work belongs exclusively to the
bargaining unit classification of Garage Attendant.

It points

out that under Appendix "A" of the contract the duties of a
Garage Attendant include:
"All phases of vehicle cleaning"
The foregoing contract language notwithstanding, I am not
persuaded that the type of cleaning involved is or has been
bargaining unit work.

It is well settled that there are times

when the facts appear to be within the letter of the contract but

-2are not within its purpose and intent.

I find that to be the

case here.
The infrequent, but relatively extensive cleaning and
shampooing of the interior of the Company's vehicles at both
LaGuardia and JFK Airports has been performed regularly and
exclusively by a subcontractor.

At no time has this particular

work been done to any significant degree by bargaining unit
Garage Attendants.

Over the years of the contractual relation-

ship between the parties, the Union knew or should have known
that this work was regularly assigned to a subcontractor (albei
as to the interior cleaning of cars, off the Company's premises
The bus interiors were cleaned at Company locations.)

It seems

to me that had the foregoing contract description of one of the
functions of a Garage Attendant been intended to include the
disputed work, the Union would have grieved earlier during the
extended period of time that the work was being subcontracted,
or made an issue of it at contract negotiations.
The record indicates that the routine, almost daily cleaning of the interior of the rental vehicles has been and continues to be performed by the Garage Attendant.

Those duties,

juxtaposed with the unvaried historical subcontracting of the
more extensive interior shampooing, leads to only one logical
conclusion.

And that is that the contract language was intend-

ed to cover the routine cleaning which the Garage Attendants
always performed, but was not designed to stop the ongoing
practice of subcontracting the more elaborate and less frequent
cleaning of the interiors of the vehicles.

-3Apparently two changes from the ongoing practice generated
the grievance.

The first is that the subcontractor now comes

on to the Company's premises with his steam cleaning equipment
and crews and cleans the interiors of the cars at the Company's
airport locations.

Previously he took the cars from those

locations to his own property to do the work.

The change in

the locale at which the work is done does not transform work
historically performed by a subcontractor into bargaining unit
work.

The other change is that for a short period of time ther

was some increase in the quantity of the more extensive steam
cleaning and shampooing.

This is because the Company kept cars

in service longer and more extensive cleaning at more frequent
intervals was necessary.

Again, I do not find this to be a

basis to transform the work into an exclusive bargaining unit
assignment.
The bargaining unit has not been damaged.

There has been

no diminution in bargaining unit work or in the number of
Garage Attendants.

As the disputed work has not been performed

by the Garage Attendants, the continuation of the work by a
subcontractor has not eroded bargaining unit assignments.

It

is undisputed that no bargaining unit Garage Attendants have bee
laid off or either reduced in their work week or in the quantity
of their job assignments by the continued or even increased
utilization of the subcontractor to perform the work at issue.
Though it appears that the Garage Attendants are qualified
to do the work; the equipment needed is not so special or costly

-4as to make impracticable the transfer of the work from the
subcontractor to the Garage Attendant; and such transfer may
even be less expensive, the Company's preference for the subcontractor is a managerial decision not barred by the contract
as interpreted by practice.

It is beyond the Arbitrator's

authority to second-guess that decision.
Accordingly, the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the contract
by subcontracting the general cleaning of
the interior of its vehicles.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 15, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 15th day of February, 1982 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Seafarers International Union of
North America, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes
and Inland Waters District, AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case #1330 025681

and
Interocean Management Corporation

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Interocean Management Corporation violated Article VI Section 1 of the Agreement in connection with the sale of the
S.S. Cantigny.
The Arbitrator's Opinion will follow in
the near future.
The request of Interocean Management
Corporation for a separate hearing on
the question of remedy, is granted.
The American Arbitration Association
shall schedule that hearing.

DATED: February 26, 1982

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ' " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD„

Eric J. Schmertz

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Seafarers International Union of
North America, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes
and Inland Waters District, AFL-CIO

OPINION
CASE #1330 0256 81

and
Interocean Management Corporation

On February 26, 1982 I rendered the following Award in the
above matter:
Interocean Management Corporation violated
Article VI Section 1 of the Agreement in
connection with the sale of the S.S.Cantigny.
The Arbitrator's Opinion will follow in the
near future.
The request of Interocean Management Corporation for a separate hearing on the question
of remedy, is granted. The American Arbitration Association shall schedule that hearing.
My reasons for that decision are simple.

I believe, and I

am satisfied that it is still prevailing law, that when a party
signs a contract, he is bound to all its terms and conditions.
Here, Interocean as an operator, signed a contract with the
Union which contained the following clause, as Article VI Section
1 ("Vessels Sales and Transfers").
"SECTION 1. (a) Vessels Sales and Transfers.
Prior to any vessel contracted to the Seafarers
International Union of North America-Atlantic,
Gulf, Lakes and Inland Water District, AFL-CIO,
being disposed of in any fashion, including but
not limited to sale, scrap, transfer, charter,
etc., ninety (90) days notification in writing
must be sent to Union Headquarters, 6755 - 4th

-2Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y., 11232.
(b) Within forty-eight (48) hours of
the receipt of such notification, excluding
Saturday, Sunday and Holidays, the Union
shall have the right to demand that negotiation be commenced immediately on the impact of such sale, scrap, transfer, charter,
etc. on the Unlicensed Crew."
The S.S. Cantigny was sold by its owner, Grand Bassa without
ninety days notice to the Union.
When the contract was negotiated and/or signed there were
no conditions, limitations, reservations, disclaimers or any other
statements or acts by Interocean or by the parties which excluded
or could be construed to exclude Interocean from coverage under
or responsibility for the terms of Article VI Section 1.
Interocean, as is the Union, is a sophisticated and experienced negotiator in this industry.

When the contract was signed

there were no arbitration or court cases or any other adjudicatory
decisions which relieved an operator from the application or
performance of that particular part of the contract.

Therefore

it seems to me that if Interocean thought that this part of the
contract was binding only on the owner of the S.S. Cantigny (Gran
Bassa) and not on Interocean as the operator-signatory, it should
have taken steps to expressly exempt itself in some probative for
from this provision, or at the very least stated to the Union that
that part of the contract was inapplicable to and inoperable
against an operator.

Especially so, to my mind, if, as Interocean

now asserts, the contract was "boilerplate." Interocean took no
such action to exclude itself from the effectiveness of that claus
Clearly, as experienced as Interocean was, it knew how to protect

-3itself against a contract provision which it now claims was not
intended to apply.

That it did not then estops it from doing so

now.
Nor do 1 find that the critical clause is so obviously
applicable only to an owner as to constitute constructive notice
to the Union that it is not binding on or enforceable in contract
law against Interocean as the operator.

It is not a clause that

is exclusively performable by an owner.

The operator can give

ninety days notice of the sale of a ship.

He can arrange with

the owner and even protect himself in his agreement with the owner
to insure that the required ninety days notice of the sale of a
ship is given to the Union.

In whatever capacity, as the operator

as an agent or representative of the owner or even as a guarantor
of performance of the contract with the Union, it is neither impossible nor unreasonable to hold the operator responsible to give
notice or to see to it that the owner gives the required notice.
That only the owner as the right and power to sell the vessel does
not mean that the operator of the ship cannot give the required
notice and/or bind himself to see that that requirement is met.
The same is true with regard to commencing negotiations on
the impact of the sale within forty-eight hours of receipt of the
notice under sub-paragraph (b) of the clause,

Again, as in the

case of notice, the operator as agent or representative of the
owner, or as a principal himself, has apparent if not actual
authority to respond to any request by the Union for such negotiations or to act to bring the Union and the owner together.

This

-4is not to say that this is precisely what the clause intended.
Rather it is to say that in the absence of any prior cases dealing
with the operator's obligations under this clause and without any
express limitations on the operator's responsibilites under the
contract, the presumption that the operator is bound is at least
as strong as any presumption to the contrary.

And I cannot find it

unreasonable for the Union to have believed that Interocean would
comply with the clause or would see to it that the duty to comply
was met.

I carefully note, that the duty I refer to is a contract

duty and is not to be confused with nor is it necessarily the same
,as the duty to bargain under the labor law.
That presumption is not rebutted by the subsequent, so-callec
"admissions against interest."

However styled, the statements and

arguments by the Union in the actions in federal District Court,
in the Court of Appeals and before the National Labor Relations
Board were, in my opinion, traditional alternative positions in
different forums, in different causes of actions in which different results were sought.

It is accepted practice and not at all

unusual for a party to pursue alternate or even conflicting
theories in one forum without prejudicing its rights to other
causes of action in a different forum.
In this arbitration the Union seeks to enforce a provision
of a contract which it and Interocean signed.

Its cause of action

is an allegation of contract breach and is against the operator,
Interocean.
In the federal court the Union sought to bind Grand Bassa to

-5-

the contract and to enjoin a change in operators.
against Grand Bassa, the owner.

Its action was

In the matter before the NLRB

the Union alleged an unfair labor practice under the NLRA and
sought a bargaining order against both Grand Bassa and Interocean.
I do not find that the nature of the proceedings in court or
before the NLRB for the remedies the Union sought in those cases
constituted a waiver of the Union's contract claims in this arbitr;
tion under its collective bargaining agreement with Interocean.
Interocean argues however that certain statements made by the
Union in support of its positions in the Court and Labor Board
cases should be deemed as admissions or concessions that Interocean
is not bound by Article VI.

Although the broad language of some

of the Union's statements can be taken as conceding that Interocean
was not bound by Article VI, a realistic assessment does not
support this view of the meaning or the effect of those statements.
In the court actions the Union was seeking to enjoin the
sale of ships during the ninety day notice period.

If Grand Bassa

was not a party, injunctive relief was not available, and hence
the Union argued, the provision might well be without significant
effect.

But in my view, the remedy the Union sought should not be

confused with a cause of action.

Therefore if it means that the

significant remedy of an injunction against the sale was not obtainable it does not mean and was not intended to mean that
Interocean was not bound to comply with the notice provisions of
Article VI of the contract.
Judge Mishler stated that as a consequence of holding Grand

-6Bassa was not a party to the agreement, there probably would be
serious dilution or diminution of the Union's remedies under
Article VI.
remedy.

But again, in my view, the Judge is talking about

The absence of the remedy of an injunction, whether

against the owner or the operator, may have deprived the Union of
the remedy it preferred, but is not res adjudicata to the question
of whether the operator is bound to something different - the
contract requirements of Article VI.
The same is true with regard to the decision of the NLRB.
That neither Grand Bassa nor Interocean committed the unfair labor
practice of refusing to bargain means that the Union did and does
not have that remedy under the NLRA.

But to my mind it does not

mean that the Union has lost its cause of action to enforce its
contract with Interocean, and particularly Article VI thereof.
I have carefully considered the statements and arguments of
the Union and Union representatives in those other proceedings and
the testimony of its Vice-President for Contracts and Contract
Enforcement in this arbitration, and I conclude that the Union's
position was and is that it would not have an effective remedy
in an action solely against Interocean as the operator.

Union

Vice-President Campbell acknowledged in court that a "meaningful
award" could not be obtained against Interocean.

In this arbitra-

tion he said that Article VI can be enforced only against the
owner.

What he has said in my view relates to remedy, (i.e. what

the Union can or wishes to effectively obtain), not to the questio
of a bare contract breach.

-7In the proceedings in the Court of Appeals, the Union argued
that:
"it has no effective remedy as against
Interocean the operator" (emphasis added).
Again, if that is a concession of inability to gain a remedy, it
is not a waiver of a claimed contract breach, the availability of
remedy not withstanding.
Also, the Union's charge to the NLRB was designed to gain the
remedy of a bargaining order.

If its failure there means that

Interocean has no duty to bargain, I am not persuaded that it also
means that Interocean had no duty to give notice of the sale of the
ship and to respond, within its authority, to any subsequent requests
by the Union for bargaining on impact.
Manifestly, for this phase of this arbitration, I have made a
legal distinction between a cause of action under contract and
remedy.

I have found that Interocean was bound to Article VI of

the contract and had some apparent obligations thereunder with whic
it did not comply.

Its failure to do so constitutes at least a

technical breach of the contract and that is the present status
and limit of my Award.

Whether, in view of the operational aspects

of Article VI, the respective powers and authority of the owner
and the operator, and the interpretations of Article VI as adanced by the Union in and as made by the decisions in other proceedings, the Union is entitled to any remedy from Interocean bezause the S.S. Cantigny was sold by its owner Grand Bassa without
:he Union receiving ninety days notice, is in no way yet decided.
my Award states, the question of remedy is deferred to and for

-8-

a subsequent arbitration hearing and the rights of all concerned
on the remedy issue are expressly reserved for that hearing.

Eric J. Schmertz

April 5, 1982

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Seafarers International Union of
North America, Atlantic, Gulf,
Lakes & Inland Waters District,
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0256 81

Interocean Management Corporation

On February 26, 1982, I rendered an Award which found that
lOM's failure to give notice to the Union of the sale of the S.S.
Cantigny at least 90 days prior to August 5, 1982, the date of
the sale, violated Article VI of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties.

The question of remedy was reserved to

afford the parties a hearing on that issue.

A hearing on remedy

was held on June 28, 1982, a stenographic record was taken, and
briefs were submitted by both parties.
With respect to remedy, the Union claims damages. According to the Union, damages means or consists of severance pay.

The

Union argues that the measure of damages qua severance pay should
assume that an SIU crew of the same size as that employed prior
to notice would have been employed during the following 90 day
period.

The amounts for base pay as well as fringes and benefits

not paid because of the early sale would be paid as severance.
The parties reserved for later negotiation any amount for overtime,
if I should find overtime should be included.

-2-

Under the Union's theory, the Company would receive credit
for that portion of the 90 day period subsequent to the giving
of notice, but prior to the sale and the discharge of the SIU
crew.

The period covered would be 72 days, according to the Union.

(The Company claims no more than 49 days is involved).
The Union relies on the formula used by Arbitrator
Christensen in the Falcon Carriers case and computes the total
amount to be $222,865.92 plus 2% per cent per month interest, plus
such amounts, if any, for overtime.

It rejects IOM contentions

as either irrelevant or without factual basis that the premature
sale was occasioned by misconduct on the part of the Union or that
there was any other contractual breach by the Union which precludes an award of severance payments.
The Company argues that no damages flowed from the failure
to give timely notice and relies on Arbitrator Cole's award in
MEBA-Texas City Tankers.

The Company claims that as a non-owner

it acted in good faith and had no control over the owner's decision
to sell, the decision to accelerate the sale, or the identity or
choice of the purchaser.

It rejects Falcon Carriers as incorrect-

ly decided and, in any event, would distinguish it

primarily on

the grounds that Falcon Carriers involved an owner-operator and
IOM is a non-owner operator.

It also claims that the expedited

sale was due to Union misconduct during the "heat wave" events
in the Houston-Galveston area.

IOM also argues that the notice

provision was in lieu of severance payments which the Union sought

-3-

and failed to obtain in collective bargaining negotiations.

It

asserts that the notice provision was intended to afford an
opportunity to negotiate the impact of a projected sale or transfer and this was made clear by the inclusion of subsection (b) of
Section 1.

(The provision enforced by Arbitrator Christensen did

not contain subsection (b).) According to the Company, the Union
was afforded the opportunity to negotiate impact and refused to
do so, but instead insisted that the Company negotiate on the
decision to sell or for a different purchaser or both, in order
to assure continued employment to SIU members.

If there was a

breach, the Company argues, it was at most a technical breach for
which no monetary damages, (unless they are nominal), should be
awarded in this case.
DISCUSSION
In Falcon Carriers, Arbitrator Christensen rejected the
Union's request for a "broad 'cease and desist'" order which would
have deferred any transfer or change in charter arrangements "until
receipt of the required 90 day notice" and presumably during the
90 day period.

He concluded that the failure to give 90 days'

notice was a contractual violation
with notice provisions."

"limited to precise compliance

He went on to state that a remedy barring

transfer "would, in net effect, convert an obligation to notify
into a more stringent bar."

In this proceeding, the Union's claim

for severance pay would convert the notice provision into a
significantly greater right to continued employment or, in lieu

-4-

thereof, severance pay.

While Arbitrator Christensen's award may

well be read to have this effect, I am neither compelled to nor
am I inclined to follow his path.
Yet I agree with much of what Arbitrator Christensen concluded.

Thus, he found that the Union, albeit reluctantly,

accepted the notice provisions in lieu of severance pay provisions
contained in other contracts.

In this proceeding, a Union witness

testified to the same effect.

Mr. Christensen also found that thej

notice provision did not give "the Union any veto power over a
change in vessel operation affecting crew employment but only a
ninety day period of knowledge of that fact."

I agree.

However, I part company with Falcon Carriers and the Union's
reliance on what appears to be a non-sequitur.

To wit, that breach

of a notice provision which gives no right of veto, no right to
defer transfer of a ship within the 90 day period and which was
accepted in lieu of demanded severance pay provision, automatically
results in damages equivalent to lost pay or to use the Union's
characterization, "severance payments."
I do not view the notice provisions as a measure to assure
job security for a period of 90 days.

Article VI, Section 1, by

its very terms, was intended to afford the opportunity for and to
require negotiation about the impact of the sale.

In this case,

I find that the Union was afforded the opportunity to negotiate
impact albeit after what turned out to be late notice of the
proposed sale, and that that was not inconsistent with the practice

-5-

in connection with other vessels.

It appears to me that nego-

tiations could have taken place after the sale, but it also
appears, because the Union was offered a chance to do so, that
there were attempts to begin discussions prior to the sale.

One

does not know that any such negotiations would not have produced
a satisfactory settlement on the impact of the sale, particularly
in light of the resolution of other prior sales involving other
ships.

In any event, the evidence is clear that the Union preferred

to negotiate the decision to sell to a non-SIU purchaser, but it
is unclear whether, as the Company claims, it rejected opportunities
to discuss impact.

However, as I see it, the only obligation was

the obligation to bargain in impact.
In a contract so relatively carefully drafted in its
attention to detail where important economic interests are at
stake, I cannot conclude that there is a job security or severance
pay provision implicit in a notice provision which expressly provides for impact bargaining as the obligations and rights of the
parties after notice is provided.

Indeed, in my view, to make

the operator liable for money damages or severance pay, requires
not only a more explicit contract clause supporting that obligation, but also requires proof of actual damages resulting from the
failure to comply with the notice provision.
Here, and importantly, there is no probative evidence on
the damages, if any, actually flowing from the instant breach even
if I accepted the Union's contention in principle.

There is no

-6-

evidence of the work history of the discharged crew members, including opportunities for employment after discharge and wages
earned, if any.

There is no evidence of what happened to the

S.S. Cantigny after the sale or what would likely have happened
if there had been no sale.

Even if I accepted a concept of

damage to the general pool of jobs available to SIU, there is no
evidence on this issue.

There are many assertions of counsel in

argument, but they are all based on the assumption that loss of
the ship to SIU necessarily is a total loss of an amount equal
to the wages previously earned on the S.S. Cantigny.
convinced that I should draw this inference.

I am not

It would be ignoring

reality to conclude that IOM who was known by the Union not to be
the owner when the contract was entered into was intended to be
subject to this per se approach to damages.

Thus, even if avoid-

ance of loss of wages was intended to be the result of the 90 day
notice provision, the loss must be proved and it was not.

The

Union had control over most of the facts, if there were any, and
failed to present them.
Therefore, although I have found and continue to believe
that there was a contractual obligation to give the 90 days'
notice, the evidence fails to show that the breach which consisted
of a failure to give timely notice on the part of IOM resulted
in ascertainable damages.

To automatically conclude that em-

ployment would have continued during the 90 days is speculative
at best.

To automatically impose the measure of damages urged

-7-

by the Union would be more in the nature of punishment than
compensation and neither the contract nor the surrounding
circumstances of breach warrant this result.

Nominal damages

could be appropriate, but I think meaningless and unnecessary.
The terms of the contract have since been amended and it is
highly improbably that the parties will again find themselves
in this position.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:

The Union's claim for money damages
is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 28, 1982
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator theat I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Office and Professional Employees
International Union, Local 153
OPINION AND AWARD
and
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

In accordance with Article 18 of the collective bargaining agreement dated March 28, 1979 between Office and Professional
Employees International Union, Local 153, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union," and International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, hereinafter referred to as the "Employer," the Undersigned
was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute involving Article 4.3 of said collective bargaining agreement.
Hearings were held on September 15 and September 29, 1982
at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in New
York City.

Representatives of the Union and Employer appeared

and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

The Employer filed a post-hearing brief.

The parties were unable to stipulate a mutually agreed to
issue.
The issue submitted by the Union is:
"in the event of a layoff, under the terms of
Article 4.3, is an employee entitled to use
her or his seniority to bump into any job for
which qualified in the participating office
from which the employee has been laid off,
and any participating office from which the
employee has been involuntarily transferred."

The Employer sees the issue as:

-2"1. Whether seniority rights apply under
Article 4.3 in the event that a layoff
takes place for reasons other than decreased business activity?
"2. Assuming that seniority rights apply
under such circumstances, does a worker
with more seniority have the right to
bump a worker with less seniority in the
same participating office where the job
or jobs she or he seeks has qualifications
which are not equal to the qualifications
of the job from which she or he has been
laid off?
"3. Does such a worker have the right to
bump into a participating office other
than the office in which she or he was
working when laid off merely because she
or he was transferred involuntarily from
another participating office, in light of
the interpretation of the words "seniority
rights shall be applied on an office-wide
basis" in the award interpreting Article
4.3 rendered by Arbitrator Daniel House on
April 4, 1975?"
Article 4.3 of the contract reads:
The Employer agrees that in the event decreased
business activity necessitates a reduction of
the office staff, seniority rights shall apply;
that is, the last employee hired shall be the
first employee laid off. Should business conditions improve and the staff be increased, the
Employer agrees to follow the reverse procedure;
namely, the employee last discharged shall be
the first to be rehired. Except for secretaries,
seniority rights shall be applied on an officewide basis where jobs of equal qualifications
are concerned.
At the outset of the hearing the Employer asserted that
the Union's grievance was not arbitrable because there are no
identified grievants claiming bumping rights for specified jobs.
I ruled the grievance arbitrable under the broad language of
Articles 18.1 and 18.2 of the contract.

My arbitrability ruling

-3was based on my conclusion that the Union's grievance fell within the category of "any dispute" or "any controversy" (emphasis
added) between the Union and the Employer within the meaning of
the arbitration clause of the contract.
The instant dispute was triggered by the shutdown of the
Employer's Computer Center in New York and the layoff of employees
of that Center, including fifteen members of the bargaining unit
represented by the Union.
In this arbitration case and in this grievance there are
no individual grievants and none of the laid off employees are
yet asserting seniority or bumping rights to any jobs.

Rather,

the Union seeks a ruling in the nature of a "declaratory judgment"
that under the facts of its submitted issue, affected employees
(except secretaries) would have the right to exercise their
seniority and bump into any jobs they are qualified to perform
in the Employer's office from which they were laid off as well
as in the office from which they had been previously involuntarily
1

transferred.
The Employer asserts that the Computer Center employees were
not

laid off because of a decrease in business activity and that

therefore Article 4.3 is inapplicable; that the Computer Center
employees had not been involuntarily transferred from the Dress

1. With reference to the Computer Center layoff, the Union is
claiming that laid off employees should have the right to bump
into jobs for which they are qualified in the Employer's General
Office (where they were laid off) and at the Dress Joint Board
(from which, the Union contends, they had been involuntarily
transferred in 1975.)

-4Joint Board office to the General Office in 1975; that the
arbitration Award of Daniel House of April 4, 1975 interpreted
Article 4.3 to limit bumping rights to the separate office at
which the lay off occurred; and that the phrase "jobs of equal
qualifications" in Article 4.3 means the same job classification which the laid off employee occupied at the time of his
lay off.
Put another way the Employer argues that as to employees
laid off from the Computer Center there are no

exercisable

rights under Article 4.3; or alternatively, if Article 4.3 is
applicable, the affected employees, because of the House Award
and/or that they had not been involuntarily transferred, could
exercise their seniority and bumping rights only in the General
Office.

And in that latter event only to the same titled jobs

they held when laid off.
I reject the Employer's contention that the Computer Center
lay off was not due to "decreased business activity" within the
meaning of Article 4.3.

That phrase is widely accepted in labor

contracts to mean not only a diminution of sales, orders or
demand for services, but also to cover the discontinuation of
work because it is not profitable or because of excessive costs.
The latter is what happened here.

Though the Center had a good

quantity of work, the Employer deemed it too costly to continue
its operation.

Also, the close down of the Center constituted

a terminal "decrease in the business activity" of the Center
brought about by the Employer's business decision to discontinue

-5its operation.

A discontinuation is at least an effective "de-

crease" within the meaning of the contract.

Hence I conclude

that the Computer Center lay-off fell within the provisions of
Article 4.3.
However, on the scope of bumping rights of employees so
affected, I find the House Award to be determinative.

That Award

is logical, well reasoned, and appropriately related to the contract term.

It is well settled that an arbitrator should not

overturn a prior Award by a different arbitrator unless the Award
is palpably wrong.

Certainly that is not the case here.

But the Union points out that Arbitrator House did not
have before him the factual situation of an "involuntary transfer" from one office to another.

Not presented with that fact,

the Union argues, his Award should not now be interpreted to bar
the exercise of rights under Article 4.3 to and in the office
from which an employee was involuntarily transferred as well as
in the office in which the employee worked at the time of his
lay off.

In short, the Union asks me to expand the House decision

to extend bumping rights of employees laid off from the Computer
Center to the Dress Joint Board office as well as to the Employee's
General Office.
The Union's case on that point is not persuasive.

For it

to prevail would mean that the Union obtained by arbitration what
it failed or neglected to obtain by negotiation.
was rendered April 4, 1975.

The House Award

Later that year the so-called "in-

voluntary transfer" of Computer Center employees from the Dress
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2
Joint Board office to the General Office took place. So, in
1975 and thereafter the Union knew or should have known that if
Article 4.3 remained as interpreted by House, it would foreclose
bumps into offices from which employees had been involuntarily
transferred.

As I see it, the Union was on notice and had the

opportunity to modify Article 4.3 in subsequent contract negotiations or to modify the impact of the House Award, so as to
include or extend bumping rights to an office from which an employee had been "involuntarily transferred."

Its failure to do

so in such contract negotiations, including the negotiations of
1979 preceding the instant arbitration case, estopps the Union
from prevailing in this case.

That latter result should have

been sought and obtained by the Union during contract negotiations
By not dealing with it and obtaining it, the House interpretation
as a matter of contract law, was accepted and stands unconditionally as the correct way to apply Article 4.3

With that finding

it is unnecessary for me to decide whether in fact the employees
laid off from the Computer Center, or any of them, had earlier
been involuntarily transferred to the General Office from the
Dress Joint Board.
I do not agree with the Employer that the phrase "jobs of
equal qualifications" means only jobs of the same classification
as that held by the employee at lay off.

Had it meant that it

2. It was a "bookeeping" or "administrative" transfer, not a
change in the phsyical location of the Center which remained
located at the Joint Board.
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could easily have said:
"...seniority rights shall be applied...
to jobs of the same classification."
Rather, the language "jobs of equal qualifications" contemplates
the possibility of more than one job

or classication which have

duties and responsibilities equal to the job from which an employee is laid off.

By its own terms in the plural it is not

limited to the single job classification or title held by the
employee at the time of his lay off.

What it means to my mind,

and I consider it consistent with traditional and customary
bumping rights, is that the senior employee shall have the right
to bump into any job occupied by a junior employee which requires
the same qualifications as the job he lost, provided he is
immediately qualified to perform it.

And, based on the contract

language there may be more than one job title that meets that
test.

It also means that the Employer has no contractual duty

to provide training or a trial period.
Under that circumstance, in my view, the senior employees
are given a somewhat wider scope of bumping rights without any
prejudice to the Employer's efficiency or productivity.

For,

if qualified at the threshold, the employee bumping into a job
is interchangeable with the one he replaces.
That the instant contract language is different from and
less specific than the clause on this point in the Union's contract with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union, does not
mean that they are substantively different.

The fact is that

-8different contract language, some better or more explicit than
others, may be used to mean or accomplish the same result.
deed, it is well settled that "greater" encompasses "equal."

InSo

if an employee possesses more qualifications than needed for a
job, those qualifications are "equal" to the qualifications required.

Therefore, the language of Article 4.3 contemplates and

allows bumping not only into the same job title as held at lay
off, but also into other jobs, laterally or downward, for which
the bumping employee is qualified.

Conversely, "equal" does not

encompass "greater." So what is not granted under Article 4.3
is the right to an upward bump.

To bump upward to a higher

rated job, even if the employee is qualified, is a bump not to
a job of equal qualifications, but rather, impermissably, to a
job of greater qualifications.
As there are no individual grievants in this case, I make
no determination on whether any of the laid off employees are
qualified for any jobs of equal qualifications in the General
Office; nor do I decide if there are any active jobs in the
General Office occupied by junior employees which are "jobs of
equal qualifications" within the meaning of this Award and
Article 4.3 of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance is arbitrable.
The Award of Daniel House of April 4, 1975
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is determinative on the question of the scope
of bumping rights under Article 4.3 of the
contract. A laid off employee's bumping rights
are limited to the separate office in which he
worked at the time of his lay off. He does not
have a right to bump into any other office including one from which he may have been previously
"involuntarily transferred."
In exercising bumping rights under Article 4.3,
any employee may bump laterally or downward into a job which he is qualified to perform without training and without a trial period, and is
not limited to jobs of the same classification
he occupied when laid off.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 29, 1982
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Incorporated;
Modern Juniors;
Belmont Manufacturers, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement when it hired a second
driver at the Belmont Manufacturers, Inc.
facility, thereby reducing the volume of
work of Lewis Frix? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on January
26, 1982 at which time Mr. Frix, hereinafter referred to as the

i
"grievant" and representatives of the above named parties appear|
ed. Roger Keadle, the employee who would be adversely affected
:

i

if the grievance was granted, was actively represented at the
hearing by counsel.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic

i
record was taken, and all interested parties were given the
i
|; opportunity to file post-hearing briefs.
||
The Company's action in hiring a second driver to handle,

I

with the grievant, its truck driving needs, was a proper exercise
of its managerial authority in response to a legitimate business
need.

The consequence of that action, namely the equal apportion-

i!

ment of the available work between the grievant and the second
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driver is mandated by and consistent with the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement and cannot be faulted.
The Company learned, primarily from the grievant himself,
.|

that his driving schedule, including his time on the road and
his rest and turnaround routine and practice, was in violation
of applicable government regulations.

As a result, to meet its

hf ;

truck driving needs and to comply with those regulations, an
additional driver was hired.
Manifestly, the Company is not required to reduce its
driving schedule or its trucking needs to meet the requirements
i|

of the law with one driver, nor could it continue to operate
II

with one driver in non-compliance with the law.

I am satisfied

iI

that its only choice to meet its business obligations was to
increase its complement of truck drivers by one additional
employee in that classification.
The Union asserts that the grievant could be scheduled as
the sole driver and still meet the requirements of the regulation
The evidence does not support this assertion.

In my view, if it

could be done it would be only if the best and optimum conditions
of travel, weather, truck reliability, and loading and unloading
efficiency prevailed at all times.

It is unrealistic to assume

j

that those conditions would invariable obtain.
probability is otherwise.

The realistic

The Company is not contractually

I
obligated to maintain a truck driving schedule with a single
driver on any such unrealistic basis.
As previously stated, with the Company's right to hire a

-3second driver sustained, the equal apportionment of the available
work between the two drivers in that classification is required
by the contract, and hence any diminution in the volume of work
accorded the grievant is not a contract violation.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement when it hired a second
driver at the Belmont Manufacturers, Inc.
facility thereby reducing the volume of work
of Lewis Frix.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) " "
DATED: March 1, 1982
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
; Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Eric J. Schmertz

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, AFL-CIO

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Inc.,
Calhoun Manufacturing

The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the discharge of Pernell
Smoak was for good and sufficient cause?
If not what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held in Columbia, South Carolina on
March 23, 1982 at which time Ms. Smoak, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named
Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and Company filed post-hearing briefs.

The grievant was discharged for unauthorized removal
of Company property from the plant, specifically a quantity
t

of lace.

She denies the charge claiming that the plant manager

Dominick Tursi and the guard John Randolph purposefully falsified
the allegation.

I accept Tursi's testimony as credible and accurate.
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I find no reason why he would falsify what he saw and what
happened.

He testified that following a report that Randolph

saw the grievant leave the plant with a plastic bag and place
it in the trunk of an automobile, and following a loud speaker
page for the owner of that car, he, Tursi, saw the grievant
go to the car, remove the bag from the trunk and throw it
under another vehicle.

And that when the grievant was confronted

and the bag retrieved, it was found to contain the lace.

Though Randolph did not testify and his sworn statement
received in evidence would be, standing alone, of questionable
probative value, Tursi's direct testimony clearly corroborates
Randolph's written report that he saw the grievant leave the
plant with the bag of lace, and endows that statement with
credibility.
Obviously, had the grievant not placed the bag in the
trunk of the car or had she not been responsible for doing so,
she would not have gone to retrieve it when the Company asked
that the owner of the car identify himself. (It is undisputed
that it was the grievant's car.)

There is only one logical

explanation for the grievant's act, and that is that she sought
to cover up what she had done.

There is no claim by the grievant or by the Union on
her behalf that she was authorized to remove the lace from the
plant.

It is undisputed that the lace was Company property.

-3The record fully establishes that the Company suffered
inventory losses for an extended period of time; that the
employees generally and the grievant particularly were repeatedly warned not to remove property from the plant or even to carry
bags in and out of the plant; that before this incident the
grievant was expressly warned not to appropriate Company
property to her own possession and use, and that she and the
other employees were specifically notified that unauthorized
removal of any such property would result in immediate discharge,

This is a discipline case, not a criminal proceeding.
The Company must prove its case "clearly and convincingly",
not by the higher standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Taken together, Tursi's testimony and Randolph's written statement, each consistent with and corroborating the other,
adequately meet the burden of proof required in a disciplinary
case.

It is well settled that this type of violation is
grounds for discipline including summary dismissal, particularly
when repeated notices and warnings to the employees proscribing
such activity have been disregarded by the offending employee.
Also, in view of the Company's inventory losses, as well as for
other obvious reasons, the rule prohibiting the unauthorized
removal of Company property is both reasonable and justified.
Under these circumstances the penalty of discharge in this case
was neither excessive nor improper.

-4The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Pernell Smoak was
for good and sufficient cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: June 8, 1982
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
GORDON J. LANG,
Petitioner,
and
DR. ARTHUR J. WISE,
Respondent

This arbitration proceeding was held pursuant to a
stipulation by the above parties which submitted to me, as
arbitrator, the questions should there be any additional legal
fees awarded Gordon J. Lang, Esq. in excess of the $10,000
already paid? If so, how much?
A hearing was held at my office at Hofstra University
School of Law on June 18, 1982.

Mr. Lang appeared pro se, and

Meyer F. Goodman, Esq. appeared as attorney for Dr. Wise.
orally presented their respective positions.

They

Mr. Lang submitted

a "petition" and a supporting legal memorandum; Mr. Goodman
submitted an "affirmation" in response to the petition.

A

document entitled, "Agreement Between Arthur J. Wise, Jr. and
Cheryl H. Wise, dated June 1982," also was received.
The Facts
Gordon J. Lang, Esq., an attorney, was retained on or
about October 6, 1981, by Cheryl H. Wise to represent her with
respect to matrimonial difficulties between herself and her
husband, Dr. Arthur J. Wise.

Mrs. Wise had been the subject of

outpatient and inpatient psychiatric treatment over the past
several years.

While a patient in the psychiatric ward of

Hempstead General Hospital, she consulted with Mr. Lang and
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determined that a dissolution of the marriage or at least a
separation would be in her best interests.

Some time around

May 5, 1982, Mr. Lang commenced a proceeding (a "separation
action") on behalf of Mrs. Wise.

Mr. Lang claims that the

proceeding was necessary because attempts to resolve the dispute
by agreement were frustrated by Dr. Wise and that Mrs. Wise
was not receiving her required financial support while negotiations were pending.

Mr. Goodman denied that there was any

need to bring an action and claims that Dr. Wise was supplying adequate funds to Mrs. Wise.

The papers prepared and

served in the separation proceeding were not submitted at the
arbitration.
A document purporting to embody an agreement between Dr.
and Mrs. Wise and described above was submitted at the arbitration.

Mr. Goodman stated that the matrimonial problems are

"now settled by Separation Agreement." (emphasis in original;
Affirmation, p.l).

Mr. Lang stated that "there is yet to be

a review of and final negotiation of the agreement." (Petition,
p.5.) The document submitted to me is incomplete in several
respects.

For example: it is not signed by the parties; it is

undated; life insurance policies are referred to as existing
and listed in the agreement, but are neither listed nor otherwise described (p.21); and the due dates for two of the future
payments are not set forth (pp. 15, 19).

Thus, the precise

status of the agreement at the time of the hearing is not
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entirely clear.
However, it is clear that the amount to be paid for
Mr. Lang's services is the subject of dispute.

The parties

agreed that Dr. Wise would pay to Mrs. Wise as separate
maintenance at least $10,000, presumably for legal fees, and
claims for any amount in excess of $10,000 would be submitted
to arbitration before the Undersigned who was to determine and
make an award of such amount, if any, which he found to be
"the fair and reasonable value of the services
Mr. Lang in excess of the sum of $10,000."

rendered by

Dr. Wise agreed

to pay the amount so determined, if any "forthwith," as
"additional maintenance."

(Agreement, Articles IX, XIV).

Mr. Lang has asserted in his petition that his firm has
already expended 132 hours properly billable at a rate of
$125 per hour, for a total sum of $16,500.

He claims that

his past services plus future services necessarily to be
rendered support his claim of a total fee of $25,000 as "not
unreasonable."

Dr. Wise takes the position that the $10,000

already agreed upon "represents a sum considerably more than
fair and reasonable."
The substance of Mr. Lang's position is that there are
unusually unique and difficult problems involved in representing Mrs. Wise.

She apparently has severe mental disorders, as

well as physical problems, which most recently resulted in a
200 day hospitalization for her mental disorders.

This condi-

tion has rendered it unusually difficult for Mr. Lang to deal
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with her concerning

legal matters.

Mr. Lang claims he has

been compelled to assume the burden of assuring Mrs. Wise's
transition in establishing and maintaining a new and separate
household and advising her concerning financial matters.

This

is due to her condition and Dr. Wise's conduct which Mr. Lang
claims has exacerbated these problems.

This includes conduct

so "parsimonious" and hostile on the part of Dr. Wise that Mr.
Lang's representation required effort and services rendered
unusually difficult and beyond the usual ones rendered by an
attorney.
In support of his claim, Mr. Lang proffered the following
in his petition relating to the services rendered and to be
rendered:
(1)

An exhibit, entitled "Number of Hours," was

.annexed to the Petition in which Mr. Lang sets forth
the dates on which 104 hours of services were rendered.
They include:
seven (7) hours where the services are not
described;
35 hours where services are described as
"met with client;"
22-i> hours where services are described as
met with client and social worker;"
3 hours where services are described as
"met with social worker;"
8 hours where services are described as
"discharged client and attended closing;"
13 hours where services are described as
having met with the client or the client

-5and social worker and taking the client
shopping; and
15 hours where services are described as
having met with client or client and
social worker and having gone shopping
for an apartment.
(2)

In addition, Mr. Lang's petition states that an

additional 28 hours in services were rendered as follows: 15
hours in meetings with Dr. Wise's attorney at the latter's office
in Mineola; 3 hours in telephone calls since October 6, 1981
when he was retained by Mrs. Wise; and ten hours in commencing
a separation action and related motions pendent lite.
28 hours plus

These

the 104 hours claimed in the exhibit to the

petition constitute 132 hours of services rendered for which
Mr. Lang claims a value of $16,500 (132 x $125 per hcmr).
(3)

In addition to the 132 hours of past services rendered

Mr. Lang also claims compensation for future services.

He

estimates he will have to expend 28 hours in explaining and
reviewing the settlement agreement to Mrs. Wise in the presence
of her psychiatrist.

This process will be memorialized in a

stenographic record.

He estimates an additional 25 hours will

be spent to assist Mrs. Wise in her transition period.
Dr. Wise, through his attorney, challenges Mr. Lang's
claim for compensation for those services which he characterizes
as being "in the nature of 'hand holding'."

He attributes the

entire 104 hours in the exhibit to the petition to these
"guardianship" or "hand holding" activities.

As to the claims

for legal services represented by the additional hours, he points
out that the "log" contains neither dates nor precise description
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of the legal services performed.

He also claims that institution

of the suit was unnecessary because funds were being supplied by
Dr. Wise and indeed, the pendent lite motion was withdrawn.
He also points out that the attorney for Dr. Wise took
6-% hours to draft the agreement whereas Mr. Lang says he
expects to spend 28 hours in review and final negotiation.

Dr.

Wise's attorney also rejects Mr. Lang's claim that the difficulties in dealing with Mrs. Wise and the rancor in the negotiations, if any, was a product of Dr. Wise's conduct.

He also

dismisses contentions concerning "fault" concerning the marital
difficulties as not material to this proceeding.

On the other

hand, he claims that not only was Dr. Wise generous prior to
the settlement, but that Dr. Wise "has been more than generous
in agreeing to give her"
vided by the agreement.

the various amounts and rights pro(Affirmation, p.4.)

In summary, Mr. Lang claims compensation for services
rendered in connection with the commencement of a separation
action and the negotiation of an agreement.

With respect to the

agreement, there remain additional services to be performed in
connection with finalizing the terms.

He asserts that he has

had responsibilities and rendered services beyond the usual
because of the mental condition of his client.

Her mental condi-

tion has necessitated extra time and effort in explanation and
in maintaining a semblance of stability so as to enable her to
deal with the trauma of marital breakup.

Consequently, he has

been and will be compelled to continue to confer and otherwise
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deal with his client's psychiatrist and social worker.

Further,

he has had to assist her in performing matters that are essentially

personal (e.g., shopping, apartment hunting) in large

measure to maintain her ability to deal with the directly legal
matters.

Mr. Lang also claims that the agreement represents

the product of much effort, thought and complex considerations.
He also points out that because of Mr. Wise's location in a
hospital for much of the relevant period and the fact that he
met with Dr. Wise's attorney at the latter's office in Mineola,
he spent an inordinate amount of time outside his own office
and in transit.
Dr. Wise has not challenged Mr. Lang's hourly rate of
$125.

He does challenge Mr. Lang's right to be compensated for

all he claims and contends that $10,000 more than adequately
covers all services rendered and to be rendered.

More specifi-

cally, he challenges the right to compensation from Dr. Wise
for "hand holding" activities and expresses doubts about the
number of hours Mr. Lang claims he expended on the traditional
legal activities.

With respect to the last point, he believes

the number of hours was unnecessary

and, in any event, no

proper "log" supports the claim.
Opinion
The parties' submssions on the applicable law have not
been helpful.

No cases or other authority have been cited which

deal directly with the most difficult aspect of this case -- the
right to compensation for those services which are not

-8-

traditionally deemed "legal services":.

The memorandum on be-

half of Mr. Lang cites a number of cases.

I have read each of

them and find they do not materially bear on this issue.
Mr. Lang also has referred to Section 237 of the Domestic
Relations Law as governing the award of counsel fees in matrimonial proceedings.

However, Section 237 does not govern the

award of counsel fees in this proceeding which is concerned with
the contractual obligation in the separation agreement and the
supply of necessaries by a husband to his spouse.
of Steingesser, 602 F2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979).

In The Matter

I do not believe

that it is his purpose to rely solely on that section which
permits recovery for the very limited purpose of enabling Mrs.
Wise to maintain a matrimonial action.

Rather his position is

essentially that he is entitled to a fair and reasonable fee
under the circumstances

for services he performed for Mrs. Wise.

The cases cited by Mr. Lang deal with and arise out of
counsel fees in matrimonial actions which are presently governed
by §237 of the Domestic Relations Law.

A summary review of the

cases appears below.* However, the subject matter of this

*Kann v. Kann, 38 AD2d 545, NYSd 75, is a First Department case
which denied the wife counsel fees from the husband for the
portion she had already paid to her attorney when he was retained
The Second Department refused to follow Kann in Ross v. Ross, 47
AD2d 866 (1975) and Press v. Press, 49 AD2d 604 (1975), and it
appears to have been distinguished out of existence or authority
by the First Department in Stern v. Stern, 67 AD2d 256 (1979).
The matter is now governed by §237, in any event.
Kolmer v. Kolmer, 19 Misc.2d 298, 191 NYS2d 545, also is of no
aid to Mr. Lang. In KoImer, Special Term denied counsel fees
for that portion of the attorney's claim which it attributed to
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arbitration is not limited to counsel fees in the context of
§237.

In this proceeding we are concerned with the fair and

reasonable fees pursuant to a contract or separation agreement which purports, inter alia, to settle the outstanding
financial differences and rights and obligations between Dr.
and Mrs. Wise.

Article XIV provides that "each will pay all

fees for legal services rendered to him or to her, as an
incident to the negotiations for, and the drafting and execution
of this Agreement, as well as respect to the execution of this
Agreement, and as well as with respect to any action for divorce
instituted by either of the parties." Apparently, provision for

making a simple case appear unnecessarily complex. The Court
pointed out that counsel fees in a proceeding are awarded "solel}
to enable the wife to defend or prosecute a matrimonial proceeding.
Vanderpool v. Vanderpool. 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 NYS2d 572, reverse|d
43 AD2d 716, 350 NYS2d 435, cited by Mr. Lang deals with the
obligation of the City to pay counsel fees for an indigent spouse
Hefey v. Hefey, 142 Misc. 147, 254 NYS 82 (no counsel fees for
annulment; marriage void ab initio) and Quinn v. Gerber, 82 Misc
2d 159, 368 NYS2d 667 (a person who claims counsel fees provided
the wife as a necessity stands in no better position than the
wife) also do not aid the inquiry. Except for general propositions concerning the status of counsel fees as a necessary to
be provided by the husband, the other cases cited by Mr. Lang
are not informative (Wood v. Wood, 21 AD2d 627, 253 NYS2d 195;
Posner v. Stone, 182 NYS 564; Marocco v. Marocco, 53 AD2d 707,
383 NYS2d 939; Schoonagim v. Schoonagim, 21 AD2d 812, 250 NYS2d
931).
At the hearing, Dr. Wise's attorney expressed doubts about the
applicability of any of the cases and specifically and I believe
correctly pointed out that the doubtful viability of Kann v. Kann
supra, as authority. In his challenge to Mr. Lang's records of
time expended as being insufficient "(w)ere this an issue beinj
litigated in the Court," Mr. Goodman cited Estate of Nachman,
(Surrogate Ct., Bronx, N.Y.L.J. 10/18/80.)
__
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payment of $10,000 as the wife's legal fees to be paid to the
wife as additional maintenance is provided in the agreement.
Article IX, subsection 2.

Any amount in excess of $10,000

determined by me in this arbitration as "the fair and reasonable services" rendered by Mr. Lang also will be paid as additional maintenance.

Article IX, subsection 2; Article XIV(c).

Hence, the basic standard for determining what Mr. Lang's fee
should be relates to his provision of services to Mrs. Wise as'
part of the negotiation of the settlement agreement.

This is

not the statutory obligation under §237 but partakes of the
legal obligation of Dr. Wise to supply necessaries to his spouse
and a contractual agreement to do so.

The language from Article

XIV of the agreement quoted above and the conduct of the parties
in relation to that language provides the standard for determining whether the fair and reasonable value of the services
rendered by Mr. Lang exceeds $10,000.
In reaching my conclusions, I have taken into account the
following factors:
(a) Traditional legal services were actually performed
by Mr. Lang in connection with the commencement of the proceedings and the negotiation of the agreement;
(b) The precise amount of time spent on these matters
is difficult to ascertain with certainty, but because of the
apparent difficulties in dealing with Mrs. Wise due to her
condition, I believe that more than the usual time would be
necessary.

Mr. Lang's claim of 15 hours of meetings with Dr.

-11Wise's counsel and 10 hours preparing the papers for the action
are not unreasonable;
(c) A significant portion of the 104 hours claimed in
the exhibit to the petition is not attributable exclusively to
the so-called "hand holding" or "guardianship" activities.
entries designated as "shopping" total 28 hours.

The

Many of the

entries involve meetings at the hospital upon Mr. Lang being
retained and represent time spent in learning about the client's
problems and preparing for litigation and negotiation.

In addi-

tion, the time spent after her discharge from the hospital also
was apparently so spent.

Further, services were rendered in

connection with the closing of her apartment and the 104 hours
includes those hours as well.

However, it is difficult to

separate precisely the time spent on each kind of service;
(d) There are some additional services to be performed
in finalizing the agreement and explaining it to Mrs. Wise.
However, I believe that Mr. Lang's estimate of 28 hours is beyond
what will be necessary and cannot be justified;
(e) While the condition of the client and the circumstances of the negotiation presented difficulties, I do not
believe the subject matter of the negotiations was overly complex
However, as Dr. Wise concedes, the result was a good one for
Mrs. Wise and Mr. Lang deserves credit for the good result.
Further, the difficulties of dealing with aperson in Mrs. Wise's
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condition should be reflected in the fee;
(f)

I have no basis for finding either that Dr. Wise

was obstructionist or that he was cooperative and hence, base no
part of this decision on his conduct;
(g)

I do not believe the time spent shopping for

personal effects or for an apartment, per se are compensable at
$125 per hour and, indeed, I have some reservations that they
are compensable at all. On the other hand, it is very difficult
to divorce some of this time from the time necessarily spent in
learning about the client and her condition and needs which
would be helpful in properly representing her in the negotiations
Indeed, the $10,000 already conceded as a fee probably reflects
the propriety of taking these efforts into account to some extent
(h)

With regard to financial circumstances, it

appears that Mrs. Wise was wholly dependent on Dr. Wise whose
earning capacity is substantial; and
(i)

There is no basis upon which to require Dr. Wise

to pay for the estimated 25 hours of business advice Mr. Lang
claims he will provide Mrs. Wise after the agreement becomes
effective.
In arriving at a fair and reasonable fee, I attribute 25
hours to item (b), supra, 60 hours to item (c), supra, and
10 hours to item (d), supra, all at the rate of $125 per hour.
I would attribute 44 additional hours to item (c) at the rate
of $25 per hour.

The total is $12,975 which exceeds $10,000

by the amount of $2,975 which I find to be the fair and reasonabl
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amount for Mr. Lang's services in excess of $10,000.

Therefore,

I award Mr. Lang an additional $2,975 to cover past services
and services to be rendered to Mrs. Wise to be paid by Dr. Wise
under the terms of the agreement.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above parties
makes the following AWARD:
In addition to the $10,000 already paid
or agreed to be paid to Gordon J. Lang,
Esq., Mr. Lang shall be paid $2,975 for
legal fees.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 15, 1982
STATE OF New York )s s *
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 3998, Long Island University
Faculty Federation, NYSUT, AFT,
AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1339 1700 81

and
Long Island University

In accordance with Article XXVII of the collective bargain
ing agreement dated September 1, 1979 between the above-named
Union and University, the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Does the University's calculation of
sick leave pay for faculty member
Linda Zelski violate Article XV, Section
7 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in New York City on April 30, 1982 at
whieh time representatives of the Union and University appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was taken.

The Arbitrator's

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The grievant was a non-tenured faculty member in the
Nursing Department of the Brooklyn Center of Long Island Universit
during the academic year 1980-1981.

The grievant was ill and

absent from her job while classes were in session during the Fall
Semester from January 26, 1981 to February 20, 1981 and during
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the Spring Semester from February 21, 1981 to March 13, 1981.
The combined absences for the two semesters totaled seven weeks.
At the time of her illness she had accrued two months
sick leave with pay in accordance with Article XV Section 7 of
the collective bargaining agreement.

The University did not give

her two calendar weeks of sick leave pay.

Instead the University

applied her seven weeks absence to her thirty week annual teaching
schedule and concluded that because she was absent 7/30ths of that
teaching schedule, during which she would have earned 2.8 months
of her annual salary, her sick leave entitlement was not enough
to financially cover the period of her absence.

On the basis of

the University's formula, and because her absence exceeded her two
months accrued sick leave pay by 0.8%, the University deducted
0.87o of one month's salary ($1,089.40) from her annual pay.
The University argues that its position and the applicatio
of this formula is supported by a long standing practice and
policy and claims that the instant sick leave benefit must be
viewed by comparing the entitlement for non-tenured faculty agains
the entitlement for tenured faculty.

The University insists that

the formula used in this case properly reflects an

intention by

the parties not to provide the non-tenured faculty with a benefit
that is superior to the sick leave benefit for the tenured faculty
The University asserts that it has always applied its formula this
way; that the Union must have known of it; that the Union never
objected and hence is bound.
The Union contends that Article XV Section 7 clearly and

-3unambiguously gives a non-tenured faculty member one month's sick
leave for each year of service at the University.

As a result the

Union claims that the grievant's two months accrued sick leave
more than covered her absence of seven weeks.

It maintains that

the University violated the collective bargaining agreement by
using a unilateral formula that both deprived her of full coverage
for her seven weeks absence and also resulted in a deduction of
$1,089.40 from her annual pay.
It is well settled that ordinary words in a contract are
to be given their ordinary and customary meaning.

Article XV

Section 7 provides, in pertinent part, that:
"Non-tenured unit members are entitled to
one month's sick leave for each year of
service to the University up to a maximum
of six (6) months."
Customarily and traditionally "one month" means one calendar
month, "years of service" mean calendar years; and seven weeks of
illness means seven calendar weeks not 7/30ths of a teaching
schedule.

There is nothing in the contract which indicates any

bilateral agreement to interpret these traditional periods of
time any other way.

Indeed such language and such customary

interpretation is common to virtually all collective bargaining
agreements.

No matter how logical or mathematically defensible

the University's formula.may be, it is simply not consistent with
the language of the contract applicable to non-tenured faculty.
There is no evidence that the University's formula is a
result of a bilateral understanding between the parties or even
that the Union acquiesced in its application.

To the contrary,

-4the probative evidence shows that the Union had not agreed to
the formula and was unaware of its existence and use.
The University's contention that the Union's interpretatio
would provide the non-tenured faculty with a sick leave benefit
that is superior to the sick leave benefit for tenured faculty
is irrelevant.

The ten ured faculty sick leave benefit was not

litigated as part of this case.

What is relevant is that the

non-tenured faculty sick leave provision is unambiguous and is
subject to interpretation and enforcement in this case.

Therefore

I find it unnecessary to go beyond the stipulated issue and deal
with the meaning of the sick leave benefit for tenuredjfacuity.
If it is claimed that there be discrepancies between the two
benefits, as a result of this decision, it remains matters either
for collective bargaining or for a different arbitration case in
which the tenured faculty sick leave benefit is at issue.
Unless expressly included in the contract or unless the
contract violation is willful or capricious, and those circumstances are not present here, it is not the practice of this
arbitrator to affix interest on monies found to be due.

Therefore

the Union's request for interest is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The University's calculation of sick leave
pay for faculty member Linda Zelski violates Article XV, Section 7 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. She shall be
reimbursed $1,089.40 which the University
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improperly deducted from her salary and
shall be credited with additional sick
leave that reflects the difference between the two months time she had accrued
and the seven weeks time she used for her
illness.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 16, 1982
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Panel
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Boston University Chapter AAUP
OPINION AND AWARD
and
Trustees of Boston University
GR: Professor Fredrik Wanger

The parties did not explicitly stipulate a precise issue.
But it is clear that the disputed questions are:
1. Did Gerald J. Gross, the Dean of the
School of Arts, breach an agreement
to be bound by a majority vote of the
tenured faculty of that school with
respect to the renewal of the contract
of Assistant Professor Fredrik Wanger?
2. If so, is the Dean's alleged agreement
binding on the Provost of Boston
University?
3. If so, what shall be the remedy?
I deem the issue to be:
What shall be the disposition of the grievance
of Professor Fredrik Wanger?
A hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts on March 5,
1982 at which time Professor Wanger, hereinafter referred to as
the grievant, and representatives of the above named Union and
University appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken and the Union and the

University filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant is an untenured, probationary faculty member
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in the Piano Department of the School of Music, a division of
the School for the Arts at Boston University.

He enrolled in

the University as a graduate student in 1982 and continued his
studies for a doctorate degree and served as a teaching fellow
and teaching associate for five years.
his doctorate.

He has not yet received

In 1977, the grievant was appointed to the facult

as an Assistant Professor without tenure.

Thereafter, he receive

four contract renewals, the last of which covered the 1979-80
and 1980-81 academic years.

During the last year of that contract

the grievant was considered for another renewal for a period of
1
two or three years.
If granted, the grievant would be considered for tenure during 1982-83.
In a letter dated November 7, 1980, addressed to Mr. Mario
di Bonaventura, the Director of the School of Music, Professor
Edith Stearns, Chairperson of the Piano Department, stated that
the tenured members of the Piano Faculty (then numbering

two)

recommended in favor of a three-year renewal for the grievant.
On November 10, 1980, a meeting of a number of tenured music
faculty was held wherein a number of reappointments, including
that of the grievant were considered.

Although Dean Gross was

1. Apparently, there is some dispute among the parties as to
whether this contract renewal should have been for a period of
two or three years. However, all parties agree that the grievant
would have been considered for tenure during the second year of
the contract. They also agree that if tenure were denied, the
grievant would be entitled to only one additional terminal year o
employment. If tenure were granted, the length of the contract
would obviously be irrelevant. Although I believe that the most
appropriate length of the contract would therefore be two years,
the dispute among the parties on this question is one of form
and not substance.

-3not present at that meeting, the then Associate Dean, Malloy
Miller, was in attendance.

Mr. Miller is now deceased. The

grievant and the Union contend that at that meeting the faculty
in attendance unanimously endorsed a three-year renewal for the
grievant.

The Dean testified that he received a report of that

meeting from Associate Dean Miller, but that he believed that
report indicated that the "feelings may have been mixed." Thereafter, the Director of the School of Music recommended to the
Dean that the grievant's contract not be renewed, but rather that
he be given only a one-year terminal appointment for 1981-82.

He

reported to the Dean that the tenured members of the Piano Department (then numbering three) were opposed to a three-year renewal
by a vote of 2 to 1.

The Director also discussed with the Dean

the declining student enrollment in the piano program.
By a letter dated April 28, 1981, Dean Gross informed the
grievant that:
"After consultation with the Director and
after considering the consultation of the
Associate Dean with the faculty of the
School of Music, I have reached a decision
in regard to your appointment. That decision has the approval of the Provost. I
regret to inform you that we will not renew
your appointment at the end of the 1981-82
academic year. Consequently, 1981-82 will
be your final year of appointment at Boston
University. "
On May 4, 1981, Professor Wanger filed a grievance with
the Dean pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement between the University and the Union.

He based his

grievance on two grounds: (1) that the Dean had received inaccurate information in that the Piano faculty was not opposed

-4to his renewal; and (2) that a vote of the tenured faculty should
be held on the question of his reappointment.
On May 14, 1981, a meeting was held to attempt to resolve
the grievance.

Present for the Union were the grievant, Warren

Pyle, Esq., the Union's attorney, Professor Eugene Green, a
tenured member of the English Department who is the Union
Grievance Officer, and Professor Edith Stearns.

Present for the

University were Dean Gross, Associate Dean Miller, and Michael
Rosen, Assistant University Counsel.

All sides agree that there

was a discussion of the accuracy of the reports to the Dean
concerning the faculty's position on the renewal of the grievant1
contract.

More specifically, The Dean was informed that the

Piano faculty was in favor of such a renewal.

All sides also

agree that in order to resolve the grievance, at the very least,
the Dean promised to ascertain the views of at least 70% of the
tenured faculty of the School of Music.
On May 18, 1981, the Dean convened a meeting of the
tenured faculty.

Prior to that meeting, he prepared secret

ballots for a vote on whether the grievant would be given a
one-year terminal appointment or a three-year renewal.

The Dean

first testified that neither the faculty members nor the Union
were informed that a secret ballot vote would be held until the
day of the faculty meeting.

He later testified that he did

raise his intentions in this regard at the grievance meeting.
After discussion of the merits,

the vote, which included two

proxies, was 10 in favor of a three-year renewal and 6 in favor

-5of a one-year terminal appointment.

No member of the faculty

was present at the counting of the ballots.

Thereafter, Dean

Gross and the Director contacted at least four other faculty
members by phone, although the faculty who were present at the
meeting of May 18 were not told that further contact would be
made.

The four faculty members who were called were not offered

an opportunity to cast a secret ballot, although the Dean
testified that he made "it very clear to them that they were
free to express themselves pro or con."

Three of the faculty

so contacted voted for a one-year terminal appointment; one
voted for a three-year renewal.

Thus, the total of more than

70% of the tenured faculty was eleven for a three-year renewal,
and nine for a one-year terminal appointment.
was not communicated

The precise vote

to the faculty, although the Dean informed

them by memorandum that the vote was "sharply divided."
On May 22, 1981, the Dean wrote to the grievant informing
him that based upon his consultation with the faculty, he would
adhere to his initial recommendation.

In that letter the Dean

stated that he abided by his agreement to "consult with the
tenured faculty."

The grievant and the Union contended that the

Dean had agreed at the grievance meeting to be bound by that
agreement.

Professor Wanger then filed a grievance with the

Provost demanding that he receive a three-year renewal based
upon his version of the Dean's agreement and the result of the
faculty vote.

The Provost denied the grievance.

The Provost

concluded that Dean Gross did not agree to be bound by the
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faculty vote.

The Provost also stated that the 11 to 9 division

of the faculty would itself persuade him to disapprove a decanal
recommendation for renewal.

Lastly, the Provost concluded that

his independent review of the case provided no basis for reversing the Dean's negative recommendation.
Article IV, §D(2) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the Union and the University provides:
"All decision to renew or not to renew
probationary appointments without changes
in rank shall be made by the Dean, with
the approval of the Provost, after consultation with the department faculty and
the chairperson."
The clear meaning of this term of the contract between
the parties negates any requirement that the Dean be bound by
the faculty's views.
is

Consultation with the faculty is all that

required and that entails only a free and mutual exchange of

views and information.

This conclusion draws additional support

from the fact that the Collective Bargaining Agreement specifically requires a faculty vote on tenure and promotion matters,
but not for reappointments.

Nor has the Union introduced any

persuasive evidence of past practice tending to show a generally
accepted variation from the meaning of this language.

Although

Professor Green testified that the faculty and chairperson of the
English Department have agreed to bind each other by the result
of a majority vote of the faculty, that practice does not
establish that the Dean of that school, much less the Dean of the
School of Art, has been so bound.

Further, the contractual

provision in question requires an independent approval by the

-7Provost as a condition to the grant of a contract renewal.

Thus,

as the Union, I believe, concedes, the application of the express
terms of the contract would result in the denial of Professor
Wanger's grievance.
The Union contends, however, that the Dean and the Union
agreed to vary these contractual procedures during the step 1
grievance meeting of May 14, 1982.

The Union further contends

that the Dean's alleged agreement is binding on the Provost because the Dean communicated the Provost's approval of the Dean's
initial recommendation not to renew the grievant's contract, and
because the Collective Bargaining Agreement provised that the
Dean has power to resolve grievances at the first step of the
grievance process.

The University contends that the Dean made

no agreement to be bound by a faculty vote, but rather that he
agreed only to consult with the faculty.

In any event, the

University argues that an agreement by the Dean could not bind
the Provost who was not a party thereto.

I have concluded that

the Union has not satisfied its burden of proving the existence
of an explicit agreement by the Dean to bind himself to a
majority vote of the faculty.

Thus, it is not necessary to

decide whether such an agreement would have bound the Provost
as well.
This arbitrator believes that agreement to vary the expres
and unequivocal terms of a collective bargaining agreement should
be clear and unequivocal.

Attention is called in the instant

matter to Article XXVI of the contract, which denies the
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the arbitrator power to "add to, subtract from, or in any way
modify the provisions" of the collective bargaining agreement.
I conclude that the Union has the burden of proving the
existence of an explicit agreement by the Dean to vary from the
contractually mandated procedures.

A thorough review of the

testimony persuades me that the Union has failed to meet its
burden.
Dean Gross flatly denies that he agreed to be bound by
the vote of the faculty.

He testified that he agreed to further

consultation as a way to resolve the grievance in light of the
fact that he did not personally consult the faculty prior to
his initial decision of April 28, 1981.

The grievant's own

testimony does not support a contrary conclusion.

The grievant

did not testify that the Dean said he would be bound
faculty vote.

by the

Indeed, despite repeated questioning, the grievant

stated only that the Dean "indicated he would like to resolve the
grievance, and within the school...and he suggested a special
meeting with the tenured faculty..."

Not only does the grievant1!

testimony fail to establish an explicit agreement by the Dean to
be bound by the results of the consultation, but since the initia
grievance dealt with the failure of the Dean to obtain accurate
information as to the views of the faculty, a resolution of the
grievance is consistent with personal and thorough consultation
by the Dean with the faculty.
Nor does the testimony of Professor Green satisfy the
Union's burden of proof.

Professor Green testified that he asked

-9the Dean whether it was the practice of the school to have a
consensus of the Dean and the faculty and that the Dean responded
affirmatively.

On cross-examination, however, Professor Green

testified that he couldn't "repeat his (the Dean's) words."

He

also testified the Dean agreed to "largely be bound by the vote,"
then that "he (the Dean) said in gist,...that in accordance with
past practice he would be guided by the vote of the faculty..."
However, Professor Green admitted that this conclusion reflects
his own understanding, since the "words I do not know."

He then

testified that the Dean agreed to the "consensus of the vote of
the faculty" and finally "to the vote." Lastly, during crossexamination Professor Green returned to his position that the
Dean had said that he would "guide himself by the vote," but
then he admitted that he could not recall the Dean's specific
words.

In short, Professor Green's testimony is equivocal and

imprecise.

At most, it establishes only that the Dean might

have given an impression that he would be bound by a consensus
vote of the faculty in favor of the grievant.
that a promise to be bound was made.

It does not show

And it is unclear whether

a vote of 11 to 9 or even 10 to 6 constitutes a "consensus."
I do not doubt the credibility of the grievant, Professor
Green, or Mr. Pyle.

It is apparent that they believed that the

Dean offered to bind himself to the faculty vote.

However, it

is well established that one side's subjective belief that a
promise had been made does not, in itself, establish the existenc
of that promise.

Though I find some of the actions taken by the

-10Dean in this case to be disturbing, if not unprofessional,
particularly, his failure to notify the music faculty or the
Union of his intention to take votes by secret ballot, his
failure to notify the faculty or the Union of his intention to
telephone other members of the faculty without offering them
secret ballots, and his failure to tally the votes in the
presence of a member of the Union, they do not prove that a
contract variation had been agreed to by the Dean.
tactics

Indeed these

are as much consistent with a plan not to be bound by

the faculty vote as otherwise.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, duly
designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The grievance of Professor Fredrik Wanger
is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 15, 1982
STATE OF: New York ) SSj .
COUNTY OF: New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Telephone Traffic Union (N. Y.)

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-81-24

and
New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Whether Louise Vann was discharged for just
cause.
A hearing was held on February 5, 1982 at which time
Mrs. Vann, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
In accordance with Article XV Section 3(b) of the contract
the Arbitrator's authority is limited to either sustaining the
discharge or reversing it in its entirety.

He does not have

the power to mitigate the discharge to a lesser penalty if he
finds that an offenses was committed, warranting in his opinion,
discipline less than dismissal.
In the instant case the grievant was discharge for violating the following Company rules:
^"Anyone who...misuses the equipment at his/
her disposal will be subject to the disciplinary action of suspension or dismissal.
Misuse of equipment, as the term is used in
this practice, includes, but is not limited
to, the following:...?. Making a personal
call from the position,, . . 9 . Establishing a
free call for any person not so entitled."
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"I understand:...4. Under no circumstances
am I to make a personal call from the switchboard. 5. That anyone apprehended failing to
observe the points enumerated above will be
subject to immediate dismissal."
The evidence establishes that while working her operating
position the grievant connected a phone call between her husband
at home and her mother in Florida; that the connection was made
in such a way as to make the call free of charge and unrecorded.
The record also shows that the grievant knew of the rules
prohibiting personal phone calls and establishing free calls
from the operating position and that these rules were well
publicized not only to the grievant but to the employees
generally.

Also, the probative evidence shows that the rules

have been regularly applied to employees who have violated them,
and that uniformly the penalty for violation has been dismissal.
The Union's assertion that other employees who violated the
rules in the same manner were suspended or otherwise dealt with
less severely is not supported by sufficient direct evidence to
show an unevenhanded or varied disiplinary practice or policy.
Nor can the grievant be excused because of her assertion
that the call connection between her husband and her mother was
a "medical emergency."
that assertion.

No evidence was offered in support of

I fail to see how it would be such an emergency

if the talking was done between the husband and his mother-inlaw and, as the evidence shows, the grievant did not participate
in that discussion.

For if, as she .claims^ her mother was ill

or preparing for an operation and that it was an emergency, I

-3think it logical to assume that the grievant would have spoken
to her mother or at least participated in a three-way conversation.

In any event I fail to see why the call connection had

to be made this way when the use of regular phone service was
available.
That the grievant is relatively long serviced without a
prior disciplinary record might be mitigating factors if the
arbitrator had the contractual authority to mitigate the penalty.
But as the contract bars the arbitrator from exercising that
discretion, those mitigating facts remain for the discretionary
consideration

of the Company.

The grievant violated the working rules.

The rules, if

violated, call for the penalty of suspension or discharge.

The

probative evidence shows that the penalty of discharge has been
uniformly applied.

Therefore, as the grievant committed the

rule violation, this arbitrator has no contractual basis to
relieve the grievant of discipline, and therefore must uphold
the discipline imposed.
With its rights so established, it seems to me that the
Company may now be in a position to consider reducing the
grievant's discharge to a lengthy suspension because of her long
service and her prior unblemished record.

If in its sole

discretion the Company did so, it should be because the grievant'
disciplinary record may be better than those of other employees
who were discharged for the same offense, and would be without
precedent for any other matters, and without prejudice to the
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Company's right, based on a legitimate business need to prevent
unmonitored and misuse of its service, and as sustained herein,
to impose the penalty of dismissal for violations of these rules
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Louise Vann was for
just cause.

jf Y-^if ii**t ---'^-^ £f^
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Tilric ~ J'T Schmertz
Arbijjfrator
DATED: March 29, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

/

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America,
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
CWA Case #1-77-958
TELCO Case #A-77-35

New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Has the Company violated the collective bargaining agreement when RSB (Plant Service
Center) management personnel access COSMOS
terminals for purposes of getting information in connection with RSB (Plant Service
Center) operations? If so, what shall be
the remedy?
The proceedings commenced before Arbitrator Benjamin C.
Roberts.

Hearings were held in 1979 on June 28 and 29, September

21 and November 26 and 29.
were completed.

Mr. Roberts died before the hearings

I was appointed by the parties as arbitrator to

complete the hearings, to consider the entire record and to render
an Award.
1980.

Further hearings were held by me on June 11 and 25,

A stenographic record was taken of all of the hearings.

Both parties submitted briefs, reply briefs and also submitted
reply memoranda.
COSMOS is a computerized data bank.

The Repair Service

Bureau (RSB) is one of many organizational bureaus, divisions,
groups, etc., through which the Employer functions.
issue is narrow.

Thus, the

It is limited to (1) accessing COSMOS (2) by

management personnel (3) in connection with RSB functions and not
in connection with any other function.
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The Union claims that accessing COSMOS is exclusively
bargaining unit work.

The Employer claims that both management

personnel and bargaining unit personnel may access COSMOS and
that, management may access COSMOS in order to obtain information which management uses in performing management
The parties have not pointed to any contract
which expressly deals with the issue.

functions.
provision

Both parties presented

evidence concerning current accessing and uses of COSMOS and both
prior and current information retrieval practices not involving
COSMOS in the operation of the RSB.

The briefs and memoranda of

the Union and the Employer reflect sharp disagreement over not
only the significance of the testimony, but also the content of
the testimony itself.

Although I would have reviewed the record

carefully in any event, the sharp disputes concerning the testimony when I did not have the opportunity to personally hear most
of it required particularly careful reading and re-reading of the
record to determine the facts.
In large measure, evidence was tendered to aid the determination of whether access to COSMOS in RSB operations was exclusively bargaining unit work under the contract as the Union
contends.

The Union presented one witness, Mario Gerecitano, and

relied on those portions of the Employer's witnesses' testimony
which it viewed as favorable to its cause.

It also relied on

opinions and awards in arbitration proceedings with the Employer
involving the use of other computer data banks.

Proceedings in-

-3volving BISCOM and COMAS were the principal ones relied on by
the Union.

The Employer presented testimony of witnesses which

challenged both the weight and credibility of Mr. Gerecitano's
testimony; and it sought to distinguish the situations involving
BISCOM and COMAS from COSMOS.
Summary Description of RSBs; "Line Cards,/' LMOS, COSMOS.
Although much of the testimonial detail appears to be
complex and laden with many terms of art, I have concluded that
the basic thrust of the testimony as it bears on the stipulated
issue can be stated fairly in relatively simple terms.

A basic

description of the Repair Service Bureau, the history of the
development of the methods of information retrieval in the RSB
and the practices of bargaining unit and management personnel in
retrieving information were the primary subjects of the testimony
The Repair Service Bureau (RSB) operates or has operated
through two groups: the repair testing group and the installation
testing group.
Service Bureau.

Personnel may overlap, but both are in the Repair
As the name indicates, the former is involved

in repair testing and the latter's task is testing lines and
equipment in connection with new installations.

There are severa

Repair Service Bureaus throughout the area.
Currently, there is some diversity in how information can
be and is accessed in the performance of RSB functions.

Up to

the early 1970?s, the repair testing groups operated in a "line
card environment."

The "cards" stored in "tubs" contained basic

customer information on the front of the card and trouble history

-4of the customer on the back.
accessed manually.

The information on these cards was

While the primary record for the repair test-

ing group was the "line card," the primary record for the install
ation testing group was the service order.

As with the "line

card" in the repair testing group, accessing information in the
installation testing group was a manual operation.

Much of the

testimony revolved about who had accessed this information and
for what purposes during this period.
In the mid-1970's access to the line cards was gradually
mechanized by computerizing the line card information in a
system known as LMOS.

Currently, LMOS is the primary data system

in RSB operations.
Sometime in the late 1970's COSMOS (Computer Systems for
Mainframe Operations) was introduced.

This is a computerized

data system designed primarily for used in main frame operations
in central offices.

It contains information which also appears

on line cards and is in LMOS.

It also has information contained

in service orders, and other information as well, including such
information as whether the frame force is "in jeopardy" of not
completing its work by a due date.

Some of the information which

ultimately finds its way into LMOS appears earlier in COSMOS,
and this has been offered as one of the reasons for accessing
COSMOS and not LMOS.

The foregoing data as well as other data

in COSMOS may be helpful in RSB functions although COSMOS is
designed primarily for frame operations.
COSMOS terminals have been installed in each RSB which
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serves a district in the COSMOS system.

The Employer claims that

for RSBs, COSMOS serves as an information file like LMOS, line
cards, service orders.

As for some of the other information con-

tained in COSMOS, if COSMOS were not accessed it would be obtainable through a telephone call to another bureau, division, or
through service orders.

Accessing COSMOS avoids the need for the

call.
Accessing Information: The "Line Cards" Environment.
Deskmen, or TDTs (Test Desk Technicians), are the key
bargaining unit personnel who test and analyze trouble in the
RSB.

The Union's sole witness, Mario Gerecitano, served as a

deskman for several years in a Repair Service Bureau.

He des-

cribed the kind of work RSBs perform and the respective roles of
bargaining unit personnel and managerial and supervisory personnel
In describing their respective functions, he claimed that bargaining unit personnel took customer complaints, filled out source
data or "trouble" tickets, and in the line card environment they
accessed relevant information from line cards, made relevant
entries on those cards and engaged in the testing and analysis
function.

He claimed not to have witnessed supervisory or

managerial personnel access the line cards or other data in preCOSMOS days or make entries nor have they done so in the postCOSMOS environment where there is reliance on non-COSMOS data.
The Company's witnesses testified that prior to COSMOS,
in the line card and manual access environment, management
personnel was involved in accessing information in situations:
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(1) where customers insisted on speaking to a manager; (2) where
requests or inquiries came from field supervisors, management
from other offices or higher management; (3) or where inquiries
came from the Public Service Commission; or (4) when management
performed quality checks on the work of subordinates.

The

Employer conceded that in the routine situation, bargaining unit
personnel performed without managerial involvement.

However, in

the non-routine but nevertheless everyday situations listed above
management personnel was regularly involved and they accessed
information themselves and at their option, depending on how the
supervisor or manager decided its management function would be
performed best.
The testimony clearly shows that supervisory personnel
pulled line cards upon receiving customer inquiries.

Richard

McGrath, while an RSB foreman from 1970 to 1976, testified he
did it from 6 to 40 times a day.

Edward Wortman, an RSB foreman

since 1969, similarly testified and also testified he pulled line
cards for various other purposes as well, such as quality checks
and in response to inquiries from other management personnel.
Dennis May, as RSB foreman at two locations since 1971, also
testified he pulled line cards with respect to the foregoing
matters as well as responding to PSC complaints.

Similar testi-

mony was provided by John Weber, a foreman at three locations
since 1970, George Brandt, a foreman at several locations since
1964, and Ralph Bozzi, also a foreman at several locations since
1969.

In addition most testified they personally made entries on

-7the cards and observed other management personnel pulling cards0
Line cards are still used in some unusual circumstances and
Dennis May, a foreman, testified he was pulling line cards in
1979.
Some of the Company witnesses had been deskmen, the same
bargaining unit position as Gerecitano's; some had also been
CWA shop stewards.

As deskmen, they had observed foremen access-

ing information in the line card environment.

As shop stewards,

they had never grieved such management personnel conduct nor had
they been instructed to grieve such conduct.
Accessing Information: LMOS.
During the mid-1970's, LMOS was introduced.
described LMOS as "an automated line card system."

Gerecitano
The Company

characterizes LMOS as "the primary data system for operations in
the RSB."

LMOS was and is regularly accessed by foremen for the

same reasons they had previously accessed line cards.
Accessing Information: COSMOS.
As noted above, COSMOS was introduced in the late 1970's
and is the primary data tool for frame and not RSB operations.
According to the Employer, less than 10% of the troubles handled
by RSB require any resort to COSMOS and management access of
COSMOS in RSB functions is but a small percentage of the 10%.
The Employer's position is that management personnel use
COSMOS essentially for the same reasons they always have accessed
line cards, service orders and LMOS and other sources of information.

According to Dennis May, John Weber, George Brandt and

-8Ralph Bozzi, their jobs as supervisors are essentially the same
as before and after the introduction of COSMOS.

They accessed

COSMOS for the same reasons they accessed manual sources and LMOS.
They also use COSMOS to obtain information they might previously
have obtained by making a telephone call to the appropriate source
In fact, there is testimony they have accessed COSMOS, on occasion
at the specific request of a deskman.
The Union's view of the pre-COSMOS and post-COSMOS environments is captured in the following statement from the Union's
Brief (p. 16):
A comparison of the pre-COSMOS and postCOSMOS work performed by the various employees engaged in trouble resolution will
amply demonstrate that the employees are
doing the same things they used to do before
the introduction of COSMOS. The COSMOS data
base merely eliminates the need for a manual
search for the appropriate records required
to analyze the problem, and permits these
same employees to make a computerized search
for, and assignment of, cable, pair and other
associated equipment necessary to restore
service to the customer.
The Union and the Employer are in essential agreement on
this point.

However, while the quoted Union statement refers to

bargaining unit employees, the Employer claims that it is also
applicable to management personnel.

COSMOS eliminates the need

for a manual search of records and in some instances contains
more up-to-date information than LMOS.

Thus where COSMOS contains

the relevant data, resort may now be had to the quick search
method it affords.

Indeed, the essence of the Employer's

position is that it uses COSMOS for the foregoing purposes in

-9the RSB.
The Employer claims the record shows that in the pre-COSMO
manual access environment, managerial personnel did access information in the first instance, as did bargaining unit employees.
Although the occasions for doing so were limited in number and
purpose, such accessing of information was regular and open.

As

to Mr. Gerecitano's implicitly contrary testimony, the Employer
doubts the accuracy of his observations, and his capacity to report what occurred.

Indeed, even if he never observed managerial

or supervisory personnel accessing information, it does not mean
such accessing never occurred.

He also conceded his observations

were limited to one RSB.
Although the Union seeks a finding that any Employer
accessing of COSMOS violates the collective bargaining agreement,
it did present through Mr. Gerecitano

testimony of three

specific incidents of managerial use of COSMOS which it claimed
violated the contract.

The first involved access by George

Spalthoff on about six occasions.

The facts, however, show that

on those occasions Mr. Spalthoff was assigned as a field installa
tion supervisor in the Field Installation Department and was
accessing COSMOS at a terminal located in an RSB office.
Field Installation Department is not part of the RSB.
not accessing COSMOS with respect to RSB functions.

The

He was
While access

for RSB functions wherever the COSMOS terminal is located is
within the stipulated issue, access of COSMOS for other functions
is not within the stipulated issue.

Hence, Spalthoff's conduct
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is not relevant to any material issue in this proceeding.
Another incident testified to by Mr. Gerecitano involved
an objection he had made to Richard McGrath's accessing COSMOS.
Mr. Gerecitano claimed that he was told that McGrath had assured
the Union that management would not access COSMOS during the
arbitration except under extreme circumstances.
that such an assurance was given.

McGrath denied

The person to whom this

assurance was allegedly given (Alvarez) was not called as a
witness.
At the hearing, McGrath described the circumstances of
access.

McGrath had received a request for information from a

higher level manager and asked a bargaining unit employee for the
information.

The employee advised McGrath he did not have the

information and that he had tried to obtain it from COSMOS.
upon, McGrath accessed COSMOS himself.

There

The Company claims McGratt

accessing COSMOS was either a "quality" check or a secondary
search after the craft employee had failed to obtain the information or it was an attempt to expedite a direct inquiry from
McGrath's superior, or it was all three.
Another incident involved accessing COSMOS involved obtaining and using a report known as a List of Pending Orders (LPO).
Although both sides spent time describing the incident, it does
not appear material to this proceeding.

Indeed, the briefs of

neither side rely on this practice as material to the issue.
Discussion
The Union, in substance, argues that except possibly for

-11emergency or urgent" situations, the Employer's managerial
employees are absolutely precluding from accessing COSMOS in
connection with RSB work.
bargaining unit work.

Accessing COSMOS is exclusively

The Union contends that prior practice

demonstrates that accessing COSMOS is

exclusively bargaining

unit work and the contract makes this exclusively bargaining
unit work regardless of prior, albeit nongrieved, prior practice.
The Union also argues that whether or not prior practice arguably
supports managerial access to COSMOS, the significant differences
between management accessing information prior to COSMOS and the
circumstances under which management would obtain information
from COSMOS requires a prophylactic rule denying all managerial
access to COSMOS.
The Employer contends that neither the contract nor prior
practice supports the Union position.

It denies that accessing

COSMOS is exclusively bargaining unit work and points to many
types of situations in which supervisors may properly access COSMCiS
in the performance of their managerial duties.
Although much of the testimony dwelt at length on the
specific kinds of information available from the various data
sources, including COSMOS, the record establishes that the kind
of information available from COSMOS is not the decisive element
in determining the function in the RSB performed by management
and the bargaining unit.

The same type of information is usable

and can be required by both management and bargaining unit
employees in performing their respective RSB functions.

Hence,
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the only real question is whether management personnel must rely
on bargaining unit personnel to access COSMOS in order to acquire
information management uses in the performance of its functions.
Based on the testimony of all the witnesses, it is clear
that prior to the advent of COSMOS, supervisory and managerial
personnel in RSBs regularly, openly and without Union grievance
accessed the information now obtainable from COSMOS manually
from line cards and from LMOS when that system was instituted.
Further, management personnel obtained information from telephone
calls, personal contact and service orders when that information
was to be used in the performance of managerial functions.
Although management personnel would personally access information
without the intervention of bargaining unit personnel, it was not
unusual that a request would be made for a bargaining unit employee to obtain the information for the management or supervisory
employee.

It appears that convenience, the degree of identifiable

personal resonsibility a management employee had incurred in a
specific situation and considerations of non-interruption

in the

task another employee was engaged in were the primary factors in
the management employee's decision.
Where line cars are still in use, the practice continues,
also without a Union grievance.

LMOS, the line card substitute,

continues to be accessed by supervisory and managerial personnel.
However, the record does indicate there was a separate pending
grievance with respect to LMOS at the time of the hearings.

There

was no written policy requiring or permitting managerial personnel

-13persanally to access the information nor was access in all cases
a consequence of emergency or such urgency that much if any time
would be lost if managerial personnel first requested bargaining
unit employees to obtain the information.

In short "convenience"

and not "necessity", was the reason for managerial conduct in
most of the cases.
Despite Mr. Gerecitano's testimony that he never witnessed
managerial and supervisory personnel access information in the
line card and LMOS environment, the evidence is overwhelming
that both bargaining unit and managerial personnel contemporaneously accessed such information sources, nongrieved and for a
long period of time.

The frequency of managerial access varied

from location to location and from manager to manager, but it
took place openly and as a matter of course.
There is neither a contractual provision nor any other
written policy that prohibits managerial personnel from personally
accessing information in the line card, LMOS or COSMOS environment
or that permits only bargaining unit personnel to do so.

In this

proceeding, the Union has not contested the Employer's position
that it is a proper management function for management to use
the information obtained from COSMOS or any other source in the
following situations:
1. responding to customers who have demanded
to speak to a manager;
2. responding to other managers on the same
or higher level;
3. quality checks;

-144. secondary searches; and
5. responding to Public Service Commission
inquiries.
In the absence of express agreement on the subject the
long practice of the parties surely is evidence of their understanding.

Here, the longstanding practice prior to COSMOS saw

both managerial and bargaining unit personnel accessing information for their respective purposes.

The current managerial use

of COSMOS has been a modernized form of what managerial personnel
did before with other methods and equipment.

These information

sources were being utilized in the same manner at the time of
the hearing.

Therefore I conclude that with regard to the

specific disputed work involved in this case, both bargaining
unit and managerial employees had concurrent jurisdiction.
However, in my view, if accessing COSMOS by management
involves the performance of a function necessarily so indivisible
from exclusive bargaining unit work, it would be proper to rule
that all such work is exclusively for the bargaining unit in
order to avoid the destruction or erosion of exclusive bargaining
unit work.

This, indeed, was the choice made by Arbitrator

Roberts on the facts of the BISCOM case when he decided in favor
of the Union.

However, as Mr. Roberts pointed out at the very

outset of this proceeding, that case did not preclude a different
finding with respect to COSMOS if the facts warranted it.
Another possibility is that accessing COSMOS is so integral
a part of the "testing" and "analyzing" function which the parties

-15have either conceded or assumed to be exclusive bargaining unit
work that a finding in favor of the Union's position would be
required.

This was the basis of the conclusion of Arbitrator

Friedman under the facts of the COMAS case, who, however, expressly recognized that the Employer could access COMAS for use
in managerial work where it was not an integral part of the
exclusive bargaining unit work.
I find the set of circumstances in the BISCOM or in the
COMAS case not to be present in this proceeding.

It is clear

that management is entitled to information obtainable from COSMOS
to perform its managerial duties.

It is equally clear that in-

formation from COSMOS is utilized by bargaining unit personnel
for the "testing" and "analysis" functions.

However, by obtaining

the information from COSMOS, management does not necessarily
perform either the bargaining unit testing or analytic functions.
This is unlike COMAS where accessing the information in that case
necessarily involved the performance of the switchman's analytic
work, according to Arbitrator Friedman.
In the instant case, obtaining the information from COSMOS
is and can be separate from how it is subsequently utilized.

Thus

by merely accessing COSMOS, no previously exclusive RSB bargaining unit work is destroyed or performed in whole or in part by
management nor does that appear to have been the purpose of
management.

The real concern is how the information is used,

not who obtains it.
The Union urges that a prophylactic rule denying management

-16access to COSMOS is essential no matter how the specific information is actually used and even if no bargaining unit work actually
is affected.

It argues that there is no way the Union can be

certain or even ascertain how information is utilized by management.

Indeed, the Union argues, there is no way the Union can

even know when COSMOS has been accessed by the Employer because
not only is there no paper record of access, but access can be
accomplished from terminals remote from the RSB locations.

The

fact that the Union did not grieve or even may have acquiesced
in management accessing information in a line card environment
can be attributed to the ability of unit personnel to observe
or monitor access and even use of the information by management
personnel.

Hence, the Union argues, a total prohibition on

management access of COSMOS is the only feasible way of protecting the Union's legitimate interests.
Further, the Union argues that inasmuch as "convenience"
and not "necessity" determines when management accesses COSMOS,
the balance of interests favors the Union's request for a prophylactic rule prohibiting managerial access to COSMOS.

The

short answer to this contention is that there is no contractual
barrier to basing shared work (or even exclusive work) on
"convenience" and there surely is no necessity that accessing
COSMOS be exclusively bargaining unit work except if one relies
on prophylactic purposes.

However, there is no evidence in the

record nor any claim that COSMOS was inaugurated or even is being
used as a guise for destroying or otherwise affecting exclusive

-17bargaining unit work.

Rather, the core of Union concern is that

management might abuse its powers if permitted to access COSMOS.
The assuaging of this fear may be a proper subject of collective
bargaining, but it is not for me to rewrite the contract of the
parties.

Put another way, I do not have the authority to pro-

hibit the Company from exercising a right on the speculative
ground that in doing so it may overstep its bounds.

Of course,

in a different case, where the evidence shows the Company accessed
COSMOS wrongly, the contractual grievance procedure is available.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The accessing of COSMOS terminals by RSB
(Plant Service Center) management personnel
for purposes of getting information in connection with RSB (Plant Service Center)
operations, does not violate the collective
bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 5, 1982
STATE OF New York ) s s > .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1930 District Council
AFSCME, AFL-CIO
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RULING ON MOTION TO
DISMISS THE GRIEVANCE
CASE #1330 1053 82

and
New York Public Library
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Library violate Article 18; Article
18 Section 1, 2, 4 and 5; Article 24 which
incorporates Library Administrative Memoranda 1 and 2 by denying Diane Lachatenere
promotion to the position of Head Archivist
at the Rare Books Manuscripts and Archives
Section of the Schomburg Center for Research
in Black Culture? If so what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in New York City on November 6 and 7,
1982 at which time Ms. Lachatenere, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Employer appeared.

A stenographic record was taken.

All con-

cerned were offered full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
At the conclusion of the Union's direct case, the Employer
made a motion to dismiss the grievance on the grounds that the
Union had failed to

make a prima facie case that the grievant

was "fully qualified'for the promotion within the meaning of
Sections A 1 and B 7 of Library Memorandum Number 2.
Sections read:

Those
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Vacancies will be filled by the transfer
or promotion from within the Library staff
if a fully qualified person is available;
and
If in the judgement of the Department and
the Personnel Office none of the staff
members who applied for the vacancy are
fully qualified for it all who applied will
be so advised by the Personnel Office. That
office will then be free to recruit and refer
to the Department canddidates from outside
the staff.
The Employer asserts primarily and inter alia that the
grievant is not fully qualified because she does not have a
"reading knowledge of French" as required by the

job posting

of December 14, 1981 and the New York Times newspaper advertisement of January 10, 1982.
It is undisputed that the grievant lacks reading knowledge
of French.
Considering the facts in this case, I fail to see how an
arbitrator can disregard the requirement that an applicant for
the job in question possess the ability to read
"fully qualified."

French to be

A reading knowledge of French has always

been a requirement of this job.
were able to read French.

The prior occupants of the job

The incumbent appointee reads French.

Undisputedly a significant part of the rare books and manuscripts
in the collection are in French.

Though substantially cataloged;

in English, it is clear that additional work with documents in
French reamin to be done.

Also, there are strong

indications

that because manuscripts of Black culture have their origins in
countries and cultures that are French speaking, additional
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acquisitions by the Employer are likely to be in French.

Consid-

ering the history and practices of the acquisitions of the Collec
tion involved, this latter assumption is reasonably based.
I find the ability to read French to be properly related
to the job requirements and hence to be a reasonable condition
which the Employer may require of a job applicant to meet the
threshold contractual test of "fully qualified."

I can find

nothing arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious or even unreasonable about the Employer's requirement in this regard.
This is not to say that the grievant could not do the job
without the ability to read French.

Rather it is to say that

under the circumstances present the Employer has the right to
require a reading ability in French, and that absent that ability,
an applicant is not fully qualified.

For the arbitrator to rule

otherwise is for him to impermissably substitute his judgement
for that of the Employer and for the express language of the
relevant Library Memorandum on what the job requirements should
be.

He may not overturn either the Employer's judgement or the

Memorandum language unless he finds them to be arbitrary,
capricious, discriminatroy, irrational when compared to the job
duties or, in some circumstances, unreasonable.

None of those

are present under the facts of this case.
The grievant is obviously a skilled, talented and dedicated
archivist.

I find simply that she was not fully qualified for

the promotion she sought.

-4With that finding it is unnecessary to determine whether
she received pursuant to Article XVIII Section 5 of the contract
an adequate explanation for her rejection.

Even if the require-

ments of that contract clause were not explicitly met by the
Employer, that procedural defect could not result in an order
granting the job to the grievant.

Her lack of full qualifica-

tions would remain as an insurmountable contractual impediment.
Also because she is not fully qualified, and therefore
ineligible for the promotion, it is immaterial and unnecessary
for me to address the Union's claim that the job was filled by
an outside hire by "prearrangement or preselection" in violation
of Article XVIII Section 1 of the contract.
Similarly, in view of my conclusion that the grievant did
not fully meet the job qualifications, other contentions by the
Union are irrelevant to the disposition of her grievance.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the parties makes the following Ruling on the
Employer's motion to dismiss the grievance:
The Employer's motion to dismiss the
grievance on the grounds -that the
grievant is not fully qualified for
the promotion, is granted.

DATED: November 15, 1982
STATE OF New York )_
0.
.00.
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my RULING.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Staff Association of
New York University

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 1330 1074 81

and
New York University

In accordance with Article XXVI of the collective bargaining agreement effective as of December 8, 1981 between the above
named Association and Employer, the Undersigned was designated
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue:
Was the grievant, LaTanya Watson, discharged
for just cause? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in New York City on March 19, 1982 at
which time representatives of the Association and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evi-

dence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant began work on November 3, 1980 and received
a satisfactory probationary review dated March 9, 1981.
some problems with her typing skills.

It noted

The grievant's supervisor,

Barbara J. Swanson, discussed the grievant's work performance
with the grievant on March 19, 1981 and issued a written warning
on April 2, 1981 concerning eight items related to the grievant's
work performance.

The grievant served a three-day suspension for
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poor work performance beginning on June 23, 1981.

She was dis-

charged on July 2, 1981 for poor work performance.
The Employer asserts that the grievant was unable to perform the job of Secretary in the School of Social Work

despite

repeated efforts by representatives of the Employer to counsel
her.

Specifically, the Employer claims that it followed the

rules of progressive discipline by giving the grievant a verbal
warning, a written warning, and a suspension for poor work performance.

The Employer maintains that it discharged the grievant

only after her performance failed to improve.
The Union contends that the Employer hired the grievant
to be a receptionist, directly from a six-month training program.
The Union argues that after serving satisfactorily as a receptionist for three months the Employer changed the nature of the
job by assigning

increased typing duties.

As the grievant lacked

the skills to perform such heavy typing assignments and had been
hired as a receptionist to perform only light typing, the Union
insists that there was not just cause to disciplinarily charge
the grievant for poor performance of heavy typing assignments.
It is well settled that an employee may be terminated

from

employment for inability to satisfactorily perform the duties
assigned to the job.

In such cases, arbitrators uniformly re-

quire the imposition of progressive discipline to place the employee on notice that retention on the job is in jeopardy unless
the employee corrects whatever deficiencies exist.
But in the instant case, there is persuasive evidence

-3indicating that the job for which the Employer hired the grievant
had duties and thus expectations significantly less than those
for which the Employer later held the grievant responsible.

The

original Request to Recruit Form signed by Ms. Watson indicated
the job title for the opening to be Receptionist and listed the
job duties and responsibilities as "receptionist for the School;
screening visitors; telephone; typing; filing; other duties as
assigned."

The job posting notice identified the job title as

Secretary and the accompanying job description provided: "Serve
as receptionist for school.

Duties also include typing, filing."

The memorandum regarding the grievant's termination referred to
the position as Receptionist-Typist.
I am persuaded that the grievant's job evolved from
Receptionist to Secretary to Receptionist-Typist between September
29, 1980 and July 2, 1981.

These changes, which carried with it,

increased typing duties, occurred despite the Employer's direct
knowledge that the grievant had just completed a training program
before being hired.

The evidence also indicates that at the time

of hiring the Employer considered the grievant to be less qualified than other applicants, but knowingly hired her because it
feared that the more qualified applicants would quickly leave the
position if another, more attractive opening arose.
The evidence further reveals that the written warning of
April 2, 1981, which summarized the verbal discussion on March
19, covered eight different areas.

Specifically, the written

warning referred to "typing, telephone communication skills,
office procedures, following through on original

assignments,

-4accepting criticism and instructions, using judgement and initiative, showing common sense, and following complex instructions."
The June 22, 1981 letter that announced the imposition of a
three-day suspension referred to "the quality of your typing"
and errors in the most routine clerical functions."

The memo-

randum of termination, however, relied solely upon the grievant's
typing as a basis for the discharge.

The letter noted that: "As

of the last memo in which I wrote of your difficulty typing
assignments, it is the opinion of this office that your work is
still not satisfactory for this department . . . ."
On the basis of these statements and the entire record,
it is clear that the Employer discharged the grievant because of
typing deficiencies.

The other problems mentioned in the letters

dated April 2 and June 22 were not referred to in the July 6
termination letter.

The discharge, therefore, did not rely on

those other prior deficiencies.
It is unfair and unreasonable, to knowingly hire a person
with minimum skills for a position, to thereafter assign more
complicated tasks to the new employee, and then discharge such
a beginning employee for being unable to perform the work satisfactorily.

Having controlled the original job posting, recruit-

ment, and selection process, the Employer is estopped from
discipling the grievant for an inability to perform the new
and different job duties satisfactorily.
In my judgement the typing assignments relied upon by the
Employer to support the discharge were not of a routine nature
that a receptionist may be reasonably expected to perform.

A
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receptionist is subject to repeated interruptions that impede
the sustained concentration

that heavy typing requires.

By

reshaping the grievant's position to include such heavy typing
responsibilities, the Employer constructively disqualified the
grievant from retaining her job.

If the Employer viewed such

changes as being necessary, it could have made them, provided
contractual obligations were met.

The Employer then could have

transferred the grievant to a more suitable position if one was
available or could have placed the grievant in layoff status
due to a lack of suitable and available work.

Under the circum-

stances of this case, however, to attach to the grievant the
stigma of discharge for poor work performance and thereby burden
her with a discipline record when seeking other employment, is
not consistent with the intent of the just cause requirement of
Article XXIV (Discipline, Suspension, Discharge) or the provision
of Article XXVIII (Management Rights).
Accordingly, my Award shall direct that the grievant be
reinstated with back pay less what she earned elsewhere in gainful employment during the period of her discharge, and less back
pay for the period between January 20, 1982 and March 19, 1982
during which the processing of this case was delayed by an adjourr
ment requested by the Association over the Employer's express
obj ection.
The Undersigned, having been duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
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The grLevant, LaTanya Watson was not discharged for just cause. She shall be re*
instated with back pay less what she earned elsewhere during the period of this discharge. The grievant shall not receive back
pay for the period between January 20, 1982
and March 19, 1982. The Employer's right to
revise the job consistent with the duties to
be performed and as referred to in the Opinion,
is reserved.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 19, 1982
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my Award.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 815, I. B. T.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0940 82

and

Polychrome Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Was there good and sufficient cause for
the discharge of Eduardo Zuniga? If not
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in Yonkers,
New York on October 21, 1982 at which time Mr. Zuniga, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above named Union and Company appeared„

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived.
Based on the record before me, I conclude that the
Company has met its burden of establishing that it had compelling
reasons to believe that the grievant had violated Company Citizenship rule #4.
The Company also showed that those rules were distributed
to the employees including the grievant and that the grievant
understood them.

By its terms, a violation of the cited rule is

a dischargeable offense.

Considering the nature of the offense,

I do not find that penalty to be excessive.

Therefore the imposi-

tion of that penalty on the grievant was not contractually imprope

-2-

If later acquired information, or if the grievant's
long service and possible innocence of any willful intent to
commit a wrong could be construed as mitigating factors, a
modification of the discharge penalty

is for the sole discretionary

consideration of the Company.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Eduardo Zuniga was for
good and sufficient cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 24, 1982
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge, Local

OPINION
and
AWARD

405

and
Case #12 30 0224 82
Pratt & Whitney Machine Tool Division

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the disciplinary warning and three-day suspension
given Roy Fielding? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on November 15,
1982 at which time Mr. Fielding, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witneses.
The grievant was given the warning and three-day disciplin
ary suspension for producing defective work.

There is no disagree

ment between the parties over the fact that he produced the defective work.

Rather, the dispute is over the Company's application

of progressive discipline.
I find that the application of progressive discipline in
this case is out of sequence and hence contrary to the universally
established methodology of and purpose for that disciplinary
formula.

As such, it fails to meet the standards of just cause.
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The parties are experienced and knowledgeable
relations.

in labor

They know that the procedure of progressive discipline

is to impose in sequence, increased disciplinary penalties for
each subsequent offense, leading ultimately, in the absence of
rehabilitation or improvement, to discharge.

Where the offenses

do not warrant summary dis missal, the employee's first offense
is treated with a warning (verbal or written); his next offense
with a suspension; and thereafter, for a subsequent offense he may
be discharged.

The sequential, increased severity of penalties

for succeeding offenses has as its purpose both the effort to
correct the offending employee's conduct or unsatisfactory work
and to put him on notice - again through the use of a more severe
penalty for each subsequent incident - that his job is in jeopardy if he does not improve or bring his record to a satisfactory
level.
Obviously, if the sequential steps are not followed and
are not attached to succeeding and subsequent offenses, the
purpose and impact of progressive discipline fail.
Here, the penalties imposed and the sequence of offenses
are "out-of-phase" with the prescribed methodology.
In December, 1981, the grievant turned out defective work.
In March, 1982 he again produced defective work.
1982 offense he was given a written warning.

For the March,

For the earlier

December, 1981 offense, he was given the instant warning and three
day suspension.

The greater penalty was imposed for the earlier

offense because the defective work was not discovered until April,
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1982, after the second incident.

Having already imposed a

written warning for the March, 1982 offense, the Company upon
discovering in April, 1982 the December, 1981 error, imposed the
suspension for that earlier mistake.
That the Company's action with regard to the grievant
was inconsistent with the progressive discipline methodology is
obvious.

The question is whether it should be reversed or

modified.

For two reasons, I answer affirmatively - for modifica-

tion.
First, a suspension of three days for the first offense
of making defective work, albeit discovered after a second similar
offense, penalizes the grievant, not for that first offense, but
rather as a second offense.

It does not serve the end for which

a suspension is intended - to put an employee on notice that because he has committed a second or subsequent offense, his job is
in jeopardy if he does not change his ways or work practices.
Also, it is supposed to "hit the employee in his pocketbook" by
loss of time, to impress upon him the unacceptability of his
continued unsatisfactory work.

Neither applies here because the

suspension attached to the grievant's first offense, though imposed after his second.

In short, the Company seeks to sustain

and justify the greater penalty of suspension by "bootstrapping"
it to the point of time that the earlier offense was discovered
rather than to when it occurred.

That is not progressive disci-

pline and therefore a modification is required.
Both incidents of defective work warrant discipline.

If

-4progressive discipline had been imposed properly and consistent
with its purpose, the December 1981 offense should have been
handled with a written warning, and the March 1982 incident with
a warning and suspension. As the Company has imposed only a
warning for the latter offense, that penalty cannot now be increased and must therefore stand. Under the circumstances the
December 1981 incident which should have resulted in only a warning, should now have that penalty attached to it.
Accordingly, the warning and three-day suspension is
modified to a written warning.

It is not inconsistent with

progressive discipline for both of two successive offenses to be
dealt with by written warnings.
The second reason that I reduce the suspension to a
written warning is that I do not find the Company blameless in
the lapse of four months before the defective work was discovered.
I conclude it could have and should have discovered the poor work
soon after it was produced, thereby obviating the "up-side-down"
disciplinary problem presented in this case.

The evidence shows

that the production schedule or production plan for the defective
work involved called for an inspection stage shortly after the
grievant made the parts.

At the hearing the Company could not

tell whether that inspection took place, was overlooked or skipped,
nor could it tell what the results were if it took place.

The

Company does not claim that the called for inspection was not part
of the production schedule.

Under that circumstance I conclude

that the Company has the burden of showing why the defective work

-5was not discovered at that point, and therefore early enough to
impose
the correct measure of discipline in its proper sequence.
.
The Company has not met that burden.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the disciplinary warning and three-day suspension
given Roy Fielding. It is reduced to a
disciplinary warning. Mr. Fielding shall
be made whole for the three days lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 30, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Grievance No. 227-1981

Local Union No. 855
and
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement between the parties by imposing a three-day suspension on Mr. Holley
Sims? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New Jersey State
Board of Mediation on July 15, 1982, at which time Mr. Sims,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives
of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Undersigned

served as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration and Messrs.
Clarence E. Bell and C. W 0 Grevenitz served respectively as
the Union and Company designated members of said Board.
Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken,

and the parties filed post-hearing memoranda.

The Arbitration

Board met in executive session on October 14, 1982.
The weight of the credible evidence persuades me of the
accuracy of the testimony of Supervisor DePalma

regarding what

happened on the working platform on May 8, 1981.

I conclude

therefore that the grievant purposely, abusively and insultingly used an obscene phrase to and about DePalma„

Manifestly,
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that conduct warrants discipline including a suspension.
On the issue of credibility, a past disciplinary record
is relevant.

Here, the grievant had committed at least one

prior offense of a similar type, showing a propensity for
what he is charged with in the instant case.
grievant's own version of the facts is

Moreover, the

prejudicial to him.

He admits using the obscene phrase but contends it was just
part of his conversation with fellow employees and that
DePalma just happened to hear it "as he was passing by."

The

grievant admits that the obscene characterization was about
supervision and that his statement included a reference to
supervisors "taking his parking spot in the Company parking lot.
Standing alone, as the grievant explains it, his statement
itself was disrespectful and with DePalma "passing by" and
considering the events in the parking lot on the two preceding
days, must have been timed and intended for DePalma to hear.
With the coincidence of the parking lot incident and
DePalma"s presence, I cannot believe the grievant's version.
And though the grievant claims he was only speaking to fellow
employees, none came forward to support or corroborate his
storyo

Rather I conclude that the grievant was angry about what

he perceived to have been the taking of his parking spot by
DePalma (or more accurately by the driver of the car in which
DePalma was riding), and, prompted by that anger, confronted
DePalma and directly insulted him with obscene language.
I do not find provocation.. Assuming arguendo that the
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that the grLevant's parking spot was taken and that, as the
grlevant also claims, DePalma cursed at him in the lot, using
the very language the grievant is presently accused of using
to DePalma, those circumstances would not meet the test of
provocation.
For a wrongful act or response to be excused because of
provocation, requires a close or immediate proximity between
the provocative act and its response.

Here, at least a full

day elapsed between what the grievant claimed DePalma did in
the parking lot and the events on the working platform which
gave rise to the discipline.

The passage of that time negates

any condition of provocation.

The grievant had no excusable

reason to remain provoked for that period of time.

He had

ample time to redress what he thought were wrongs done him by
reporting them to the Union and by complaining through the
grievance procedures of the contract.

There were no immediate

or sequential events in the facts of this case which would
allow an emotional or unthinking response to an alleged act
or statement of provocation.
Hence I need not decide what in fact happened in the
parking lot on the day or days before the incident for which
the grievant was discipline0
The suspension of the grievant is upheld.

Dated: October 24, 1982

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
Local Union No. 855
Grievance No. 227-1981
and
Public Service Electric & Gas Co,

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators
in the above matter and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties make the following
AWARD:
The three day suspension of Holley
Sims did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement.

r
Eric /3. Schmertz
Chairman

C. W. Grevenitz
Concurring

Calvin E. Bell
Dissenting

DATED: October 24, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED: -^*=. TSTATE OF
COUNTY OF

1982

I, C. W. Grevenitz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED r^t/t 7
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1982

I, Calvin E. Bell do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Grievance No. 227-1981

Local Union No. 855
and
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

Q
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement between the parties by imposing a three-day suspension on Mr. Holley
Sims? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New Jersey State
Board of Mediation on July 15, 1982, at which time Mr. Sims,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives
of the above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Undersigned

served as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration and Messrs.
Clarence E. Bell and C. W. Grevenitz served respectively as
•
the Union and Company designated members of said Board. The
Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was taken}

and the parties filed post-hearing memoranda.

The Arbitration

Board met in executive session on October 14, 1982.

i

The weight of the credible evidence persuades me of the
accuracy of the testimony of Supervisor DePalma

regarding what

happened on the working platform on May 8, 1981.

I conclude

therefore that the grievant purposely, abusively and insultingly used an obscene phrase to and about DePalma.

Manifestly,

-2that conduct warrants discipline including a suspension.
On the issue of credibility, a past disciplinary record
is relevant.

Here, the grievant had committed at least one

prior offense of a similar type, showing a propensity for
what he is charged with in the instant case.
grievant's own version of the facts is

Moreover, the

prejudicial to him.

He admits using the obscene phrase but contends it was just
*

part of his conversation with fellow employees and that
DePalma just happened to hear it "as he was passing by."

The

grievant admits that the obscene characterization was about
supervision and that his statement included a reference to
supervisors "taking his parking spot in the Company parking lot.I'
Standing alone, as the grievant explains it, his statement!
I

itself was disrespectful and with DePalma "passing by" and
considering the events-in the parking lot on the two preceding
days, must have been timed and intended for DePalma to hear.
With the coincidence of the parking lot incident and
DePalma's presence, I cannot believe the grievant's version.
And though the grievant claims he was only speaking to fellow
employees, none came forward to support or corroborate his
story.

Rather I conclude that the grievant was angry about wha

he perceived to have been the taking of his parking spot by
DePalma (or more accurately by the driver of the car in which
DePalma was riding), and, prompted by that anger, confronted
DePalma and directly insulted him. with obscene language.
I do not find provocation-. Assuming arguendo that the

j
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that the grievant's parking spot was taken and that, as the
grievant also claims, DePalma cursed at him in the lot, using
the very language the grievant is presently accused of using
to DePalma, those circumstances would not meet the test of
provocation.
For a wrongful act or response to be excused because of
provocation, requires a close or immediate proximity between
the provocative act and its response.

Here, at least a full

day elapsed between what the'grievant claimed DePalma did in
the parking lot and the events on the working platform which
gave rise to the discipline.

The passage of that time negates

any condition of provocation.

The grievant had no excusable

reason to remain provoked for that period of time.

He had

ample time to redress what he thought were wrongs done him by
reporting them to the,/Union and by complaining through the
grievance procedures of the contract.

There were no immediate

or sequential events in the facts of this case which would
allow an emotional or unthinking response to an alleged act
or statement of provocation.
Hence I need not decide what in fact happened in the
parking lot on the day or days before the incident for which
the grievant was discipline.
The suspension of the grievant is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz

Dated: October 24, 1982

lairman
(^

-.-

- , - _

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United States Steel Corporation (USS
Great Lakes Fleet Services, Inc.)
OPINION

and
and

District 2, Marine Engineers
Beneficial Association - Associated
Maritime Officers, AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case #55-30-0155-82

and

Great Lakes And Rivers District,
Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO,
also known as Great Lakes And Rivers
Maritime Organization of the International
Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots
The International Marine Division of the
ILA, AFL-CIO

The stipulated issues are:
Which collective bargaining agreement, Joint
Exhibit 1 or Joint Exhibit 2, covers Licensed
Mates aboard the SS Anderson, Callaway and
Clarke; vessels owned and operated by United
States Steel Great Lakes Fleet Service, Inc.,
a wholly owned subsidiary of United States
Steel Corporation? If it is Joint Exhibit 1,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on August
25, 1982 at which time United States Steel Corporation (USS
Great Lakes Fleet Servies, Inc.,), hereinafter referred to as
the Company, and representatives of District 2, Marine Engineers
Beneficial Association, Associated Maritime Officers, AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as MEBA, and Masters, Mates and Pilots
Great Lakes and Rivers District ILA, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as MMP, appeared.

All concerned were afforded full
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opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken and

MEBA and MMP filed post-hearing briefs.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived.
This grievance involves a jurisdictional dispute between MEBA
1
and MMP over representation of licensed mates aboard the SS
Arthur M. Anderson, Cason J. Callaway and Phillip R. Clarke.
The mates aboard these ships, which were constructed in the 1950'
as straight decker bulk freight vessels, were represented for
many years without dispute by MMP pursuant to its various collective bargaining agreements with the Company.

However, during

the 1981-1982 winter season, the vessels were equipped with deck
booms which permits them to self-unload cargo without the necessity
of using shore-based equipment.

These vessels had been, and

despite the change in their configuration, will continue to be
primarily engaged in the transport of iron ore. Subsequent to
their conversion to self-unloaders, the Company decided to continu
to staff them with licensed mates represented by MMP.

MEBA, how-

ever, filed this grievance contending that it now has jurisdiction
over these vessels pursuant to Article I, Section 2 of its 1980
collective bargaining agreement with the Company which provides:
"The Company recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining agency with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and conditions of employment for all...Licensed Mates...
employed on deck-equipped boom-type self-unloader
vessels operated by the Company's Great Lakes Fleet."

1.

The Company has taken a position of neutrality with respect
to this dispute.

-3MEBA argues that, since the three vessels in issue in this proceeding are now "deck equipped boom-type self-unloader vessels,"
they come under its jurisdiction rather than that of MMP.

Further,

MEBA contends that the vessels are no longer covered by the
language of the 1980 collective bargaining agreement between MMP
and the Company which provides:
"The Company recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining agency with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of work and conditions of employment for all Licensed Mates
employed on straight-decker bulk freight
vessels used to transport steel products and
newly constructed vessels engaged primarily
in the transport of iron ore...."
The evidence clearly demonstrates that these vessels are now
"deck-equipped boom-type self-unloader vessels" and are no longer
"straight-decker bulk freight vessels."

MMP does not contend that

the ships have been "newly constructed," or used to transport
steel products.

Instead, MMP asserts that, it "can see no differ-

ence between a newly constructed vessel engaged in the iron ore
trade and a vessel that was in the iron ore trade, has improvements made thereon, and returns to the identical trade such as
the Anderson, Callaway and Clarke," and that the collective bargaining agreements among the parties are really intended to divide
jurisdiction between MMP and MEBA by reference to the cargo which
the vessels primarily transport.

More specifically, MMP argues

that past practice and history demonstrate that vessels which
primarily transport iron ore, such as the three in issue in this
proceeding, are within its jurisdiction, while those which primarily transport limestone are within the jurisdiction of MEBA.

-4A thorough review of the transcript, exhibits and arguments
of the parties has persuaded me that the plain and unambiguous
language of the agreements among the parties mandates that the
licended mates aboard these vessels as they are now equipped be
covered by the MEBA contract.

It is to the clear contract lan-

guage that the arbitrator is bound.

MMP has not introduced

sufficiently persuasive evidence to establish a clear and consistent past practice which led or should have led MEBA to believe
that the contracts among the parties mean something other than
what they said, or that the contract language has been changed by
the conduct of the parties.
The contractual language used to define the scope of the
bargaining rights of both MEBA and MMP has remained without material change since March, 1968.

Juxtaposed, the two jurisdictional

clauses grant MEBA representational rights for licensed mates aboard all deck-equipped boom-type, self-unloader vessels, unless
they are newly constructed and engaged primarily in the transport
of iron ore or unless they transport steel products.

Clearly,

the only boom-type self-unloader vessels to which the MMP may
make claim are those newly constructed and engaged in carrying
iron ore or those

transportating steel.

The instant disputed vessels are not "newly constructed and
engaged in the transport of iron ore."
is that they transport iron ore.

The most that can be said

But they do not meet the addi-

tional requirement of being "newly constructed," and hence do not
qualify for MMP jurisdiction under the contract language.
The disputed ships are no longer "straight-decker bulk freight
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vessels.

The cargo reference in the MMP contract is manifestly

connected to the ship's configuration.
tractually determinative.

Cargo alone is not con-

There is no disagreement over the fact

that both types of vessels can and have transported iron ore and
limestone.
Further, the language of the contract was the product of an
intensive collective bargaining process among knowledgeable and
sophisticated parties„

If the Company and MMP intend to divide

jurisdiction among the unions on some basis other than that which
was unambiguously stated, they could and should have done so by
the use of simple language using cargo as the crucial determinant
Indeed, the Company's agreements with the Steelworkers' locals
explicitly distinguishes between vessels "primarily used for the
transport of iron ore" and those "primarily used for the transport of limestone."

The Steelworkers' agreements were negotiated

for the Company by Mr. C. Edward Newmeyer, the Company's then
Director of Labor Relations0

Newmeyer also negotiated the 1968

MEBA and MMP agreements for the Company and no such similar delineating language was included.

Although MEBA and MMP have each

negotiated four agreements with the Company since 1968, neither
the Company nor MMP made any changes in the "scope" language to
reflect a general distinction based upon cargo.
It is clear that prior to 1968 MEBA represented licensed
mates aboard vessels belong to the Bradley Fleet which were
primarily engaged in the transport of limestone and MMP represented licensed mates aboard vessels belonging to the Pittsburgh Fleet

-6which were primarily engaged in the transport of iron ore.

How-

ever, the evidence also shows that all but one of the vessels then
2
in the Pittsburgh Fleet were straight deckers and apparently all
of those in the Bradley Fleet were self-unloaders.

Hence the

earlier practice was consistent with the physical configuration
of the ships as specified in the language of the agreements.

MMP

has established that since 1968 it, and not MEBA, has represented
licensed mates aboard vessels primarily engaged in the transport
of iron ore.

However, the evidence also demonstrates that since

1968, MEBA has represented licensed mates aboard all self-unload3
ers, except for newly constructed vessels carrying iron ore and
4
vessels transporting steel products. Further, between 1956 and
1967 four vessels were removed from MMP's jurisdiction
after the
"
ships were converted from straight deckers to self-unloaders.
Eventually, these ships were staffed by MEBA mates, Although after
conversion the vessels were used primarily to transport limestone,
their transfer out of MMP's jurisdiction is as much probative of
the parties intent to assign jurisdiction by configuration as by
cargo.

2.
3.
4.

The one vessel which was not was the Clifford Hood which was
used to transport steel products.
The evidence demonstrates that the Blough, Gott and Speer
fall within this category.
As noted previously, the evidence demonstrates that the
Clifford Hood falls within this category.

-7The only witness for MMP who purported to testify directly
as to "meaning," was Newmeyer.

He testified, fourteen years

after the execution of those agreements, that the Company intended to divide jurisdiction among the unions on the basis of cargo
rather than configuration.

However, Newmeyer did not testify

that MEBA had or should have had a similar understanding in light
of the clear language of its agreement.

Indeed, Newmeyer admitted

that "I don't know whether it was the union's desire, but we had
to eliminate the term "Pittsburgh Fleet."

In response to a

question as to the Company's intent, he cautioned that "there
was different language at different times."

Lastly, the contem-

poraneous documentary evidence introduced by MEBA, including the
certification of the results of the election between MEBA and
MMP, uses physical configuration and not cargo in assigning
jurisdiction among the unions.
MMP's reliance on the position taken by the Company during
the most recent collective bargaining between the parties is also
unpersuasive.

During those negotiations, Mr. William Miller,

Vice President Labor Relations, USS, wrote MMP concerning the
three vessels in issue in this proceeding and stated:
"It is planned that upon resumption of operation by these three vessels following the refitting, they will be assigned primarily in
the transport of iron ore. Given this fact,
and the fact that your Union has heretofore
been the bargaining representative for the
Mates on these vessels, the Company intends
to continue its recognition of your Union in
respect to these mates."
However, the uncontradicted

evidence indicates that the

-8Company did not reach any such agreement with MEBA with respect
to these vessels.

Indeed, the Company has explicitly maintained

a position of neutrality on the issues in this proceeding.

Thus,

I find that the Company's position taken during the most recent
negotiations with MMP was only a reflection of its desire to
maintain the then status quo unless and until the matter would
be resolved by litigation or arbitration.

Any other conclusion

would create a situation wherein the Company would probably be
required to breach one of the collective bargaining agreements,
since no agreement between the Company and MMP could bind MEBA
which was not a party thereto.

In other words, for Miller's

letter to MMP to be determinative, the Company's assignment
should have been translated not just into an agreement with MMP,
but critically, had to be agreed to, or acquiesced in by MEBA.
In this case, neither agreement, knowledge or acquiescence can
be imputed to MEBA.
Lastly, there is no dispute that MEBA licensed mates are or
would be equally capable as those of MMP in performing their
duties on these vessels, even if the ships are used to transport
iron ore.

In fact, the Company's neutraility is indication that

competency is not an issue.

If by this ruling MMP suffers more
5
than MEBA, by the loss of vessels from its jurisdiction, the

hardship is a result of the clear and unambiguous language of
the agreements entered into among and between the parties over
the last fourteen years.

5.

The evidence demonstrates that the Clarke is one of the
three vessels currently transporting iron ore under MMP's
jurisdiction.

-9For the reasons set forth above, the MEBA grievance is
granted.

In accordance with the express stipulations between

MEBA and the Company, I do not now decide what damages, if any,
may be owed by the Company to licensed mates represented by MEBA,
Instead, I refer that issue to the parties for resolution within 30 days.

I will, however, retain jurisdiction over this case

in the event that that issue cannot be so resolved.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Joint Exhibit No. 1, the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the United States Steel
Company and District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial
Association covers the Licensed Mates aboard the
SS Anderson, Callaway and Clarke.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 26, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE,

ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1012

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Veterans Administration Medical Center
Lyons, New Jersey

The stipulated issue is:
Was Jeanne Edwards assaulted by her supervisor, James McAdam?
A hearing was held at the Medical Center on May 19, 1982.
Representatives of the above named Union and Medical Center
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The Union and Medical Center

filed post-hearing statements.
There is a threshold issue of arbitrability.

The Medical

Center asserts that the grievance is not arbitrable because the
Union failed to comply with certain time limits set forth in
Step 2 of Article 23 (Grievance and Arbitration Procedures) of
the collective bargaining agreement.

More specifically the

Medical Center claims that the Union failed to process the
grievance from Step 1 to Step 2 within the prescribed five
calendar days; also failed to notify the Medical Center that it
was taking the dispute to arbitration within the fifteen calendar
days prescribed in Step 2(a); and failed additionally to request
a list of arbitrators from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
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Service within the fifteen day time period required by Step 2(b).
Article 23 Section 8 reads:
All time limits in this Article will be
extended only in individual grievances
by mutual consent. Failure of the Center
to observe the time limits shall entitle
the employee to advance the grievance to
the next step. If the employee or the Union
fails to appeal from one step to the next
step within the time limits established in
this Grievance Procedure, the grievance shall
be considered settle(sic) on the basis of the
last decision and the grievance shall not be
subject to further appeal or consideration.
The parties are reminded that they, not this arbitrator, negotiated and agreed to Section 8.

That clause is clear and explici

It makes the time limits set forth in the Steps of the grievance
procedure mandatory.
terms of the contract.

The arbitrator cannot ignore or change the
Therefore unless there has been a mutual

agreement to extend the time limits, a waiver of the time limits,
or a past practice which has ignored them, those time periods
are statutes of limitation binding on the parties and the
arbitrator.
In the instant case I find that the Union constructively
and hence substantially complied with the five calendar day
time limit in processing the grievance from Step 1 to Step 2
following the answer of the Canteen Officer.
answer was given on August 12, 1981.

The Medical Center'

Though the Union did not

specifically appeal the grievance to the Canteen Field Director
until September 28, it did notify the Canteen Officer and the
Medical Center Director by separate letters both dated August 14,
1981 that the Step 1 answer was unsatisfactory and in both
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letters requested an investigation of the facts.

Though the

two letters of August 14th did not specifically comply with all
aspects of Step 2 (e.g. they failed to communicate dissatisfaction with the Step 1 answer to the Cantee Field Director),
I am satisfied that both letters, submitted within two calendar
days after the Center's Step 1 answer, served to notify the
Medical Center of the Union's plan to pursue the grievance
further.

In that respect I conclude that it met the purpose

and intent of the five-day time limit prescribed by Step 2.
However, the Union failed to comply with the requirements
that it notify the Medical Center and the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service within fifteen calendar days following the
Center's Step 2 answer.

Nor can I find constructive or even

substantial compliance with those time limits.
The Medical Center Director responded to the Union's
August 14th letter by a letter dated August 19th.

The last

letter from the Medical Center's Canteen Field Director is dated
September 4, 1981.

Though the Union again wrote the Field

Director on September 28 asking for "a survey and review of the
case," that letter did not indicate to the Medical Center that
the Union was "taking the issue to binding arbitration." In view
of the express requirement that the Union inform the Center of
its plan to initiate an arbitration, I am unable to construe the
Union's letter of September 28th as constructive or substantial
compliance with that explicit condition.
The first notice of the Union's intent to seek arbitration
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of this grievance is in its letter of October 22nd to the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, copies of which
were sent to the Medical Center's Canteen Officer and Canteen
Field Director.

October 22 is well beyond a fifteen day period

from any of the Medical Center's last letters in answer or
response to the grievance at Step 2.
Section 8 accords the Union the right to advance the
grievance to the next step if the Medical Center fails to
observe the time limits.

Therefore the Union cannot persuasively

claim that it could not comply with the time limits to notify
the Center of its intent to arbitrate and to seek the assistance
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service because of
any substantive omissions in the Center's letters or because of
any failure by the Center to undertake the investigation which
the Union sought.

Section 8 requires the Union to process the

grievance in accordance with the contract time limits irrespective of the Center's answers, or failure to answer, and if the
Union does not do so Section 8 mandates that the grievance be
considered settled "on the basis of the last decision and the
grievance shall not be subject to further appeal or consideration
In the instant case there is no . evidence that the parties
mutually agreed to extend the prescribed time limits.

There is

no evidence that the Medical Center waived the time limits or
that there has been a past practice ignoring the time limits.
Hence, the Center is within its rights to assert the time limits
as a defense and to insist that those time limits and the

-6-

not unhesitatingly comply with McAdam's directives regarding
where she was to work and what she was to do.
complete cleaning the refrigerator, and he
to the salad cases.

She wanted to

wanted her to attend

It is well settled that an employee must

comply with the instructions of supervision even if she believes
those instructions to be wrong.

The exceptions to that rule

were not present in the instant case.

Had the grievant not

insisted on completing the work in the refrigerator before working on the salad cases as instructed, the incident involving
the refrigerator door would not have taken place.

This is not

to excuse McAdam for his loss of temper and for his improper
physical response (by slamming the refrigerator door) when the
grievant would not move from that location.

Rather it is to say

that both bear blame for what happened.
Finally, and significantly, had I dealt with the merits
of this case, I would not have been able to grant the remedy
which the Union seeks.
and transferred.

The Union asks that McAdam be demoted

The Arbitrator's authority extends to employees

covered by the collective bargaining agreement and to the enforcement of the contractual provisions.

It does not extend to

fashioning or imposing discipline on supervisory employees.

It

is my recommendation however that if practicable, the grievant
and McAdam be separated and be assigned to work in different
locations or on different shifts.
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provisions of Section 8 be enforced.
Accordingly, because 48 days elapsed from the September
4th Field Director's answer to October 22 when the Union filed
the grievance with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
and 24 days elapsed between the Union's letter of September 28
to the Field Director and its October 22nd request for arbitration, the grievance is not arbitrable because it was not noticed
for arbitration to the Medical Center or to the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service within the respective fifteen day time
periods required by Step 2(a)(b) of the contract.
Lest this be an incomplete answer to the grievance, I
shall make some comments, in the form of dicta, on the merits
of the grievance.

There is no question that Supervisor McAdam

and the grievant engaged in a heated argument concerning the
work which the grievant was to perform.

I think that McAdam, in

an unplanned and spontaneous effort to get the grievant to move
to the location where he wanted her to work, angrily and vigorously closed the refrigerator door on her shoulder when she would
not move away from the refrigerator.

In this regard I accept the

grievant's testimony, which was clear, unequivocal, and unshaken.
I reject McAdam's assertion that she "pushed herself back against
the refrigerator door," Because the incident took place as part
of a confrontation, with tempers high, I would conclude that
McAdam's act though wrong was more a matter of negligence and
foolishness than a willful assault.
"contributory

There are elements of

negligence" on the part of the grievant.

She did
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance on behalf of Jeanne
Edwards is not arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July 27, 1982
STATE OF New York )s s *
COUNTY OF New York ) " " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AFGE

Local

1119
Stipulation
and

FDR Veterans Administration
Hospital

Without prejudice to the positions of the parties on
the merits, the dispute over the removal of Dr. Chimapan is
resolved on the following basis:
(1) Dr. Chimapan shall be reinstated to the
position of Dietition Grade 9 as soon as
a vacancy exists at the FDR Veterans
Hospital. (Said vacancy is expected within the next month as an incumbent employee
is expected to be transferred to Long Beach).
(2) Dr. Chimapan shall begin the regular probationary period anew; shall be subject
to that status for the requisite period;
and shall not receive any back pay.
(3) It is expected that when reinstated, Dr.
Chimapan will not be under the direct
supervision of Ms. Pedersen.
(4) Mr. Schmertz shall retain jurisdiction
over this matter for the probationary
period and in the case of any dispute
either side may refer the matter back
for further proceedings.
(5) In case
because
rialize
of this

the foregoing cannot be implemented
the expected vacancy does not mateby November 22nd, a further hearing
case is scheduled for November 22, 1982.

DATED: October 20, 1982

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION

and

Whitcom Investment Company

AWARD
and

Thomas W. Smith

The stipulated issue is:
Under all the circumstances, what is
fair for Thomas W. Smith to contribute to Whitcom?
Hearings were held on July 22, 1982, August 24, 1982,
August 26, 1982, September 10, 1982 and October 4, 1982, at
which time Messrs. Walter Thayer and Edward Barlow, representatives of Whitcom Investment Company, hereinafter referred
to as "Whitcom,"

and Thomas W. Smith, hereinafter referred to

as "Smith," appeared.

Mr. Alan Englander also appeared as a

representative of Smith.

All concerned were afforded the

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken of

all hearings except for the hearing of July 22, 1982.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Based on the entire record before me I find no probative
reason why Smith should not be bound to the contract he agreed
1
to dated February 1, 1973.
Though the primary settlement arising out of the U. S.
Financial Incorporated litigations between the plaintiff shareholders and Whitcom was large and expensive, I am not persuaded

1. The Agreement was not actually executed until June, 1973.
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that it was either excessive or imprudent under the circumstances involved, particularly in the light of the potential
liability of the Whitcom partners who were directors of U.S.
Financial Incorporated.

I conclude that irrespective of

actual liaibility, Whitcom had realistic grounds to fear that
a suit against its partners who were U.S. Financial directors
would result in a joint and several judgment far in excess of
the settlements.
In reaching agreement on the terms of the contract dated
February 1, 1973, Smith had ample opportunity to limit the extent of his 57o contribution liaibility or to provide for a reopening or renegotiation of that agreement if the level of
possible settlement exceeded any point.

I conclude that the

possibility of what Smith would view to be a large settlement
was or should have been reasonably within his contemplation at
the time the 5% agreement was reached.

Smith had the opportun-

ity to, and did indeed seek legal advice on that agreement before he accepted it.

Yet no limitations on the magnitude of

an ultimate settlement or Smith's percentage liability thereof
were sought by Smith and no such limitations were included.
Though Whitcom could have kept Smith informed as the settlement negotiations reached higher economic levels, I find no
obligation on the part of Whitcom to have done so.
Also, I do not view the agreement to arbitrate as a
waiver by Whitcom of its claim that Smith is and was bound by
that contract.

The agreement to arbitrate was, in my view,

-3-

basically procedural. It substituted the forum of arbitration
for litigation in court to determine the ultimate rights and
liaibilities of the parties.

But the substantive rights of

the parties were reserved, including the right of Whitcom to
assert the continued applicability of Smith's agreement to pay
57o of the total settlements, attorneys fees and other costs and
expenses.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Under all the circumstances what is fair
for Thomas Smith to contribute to Whitcom
is as follows:
Less the amount he has already paid, Smith
is directed to pay to Whitcom forthwith the
amount equal to 5% of the settlements, attorneys fees and other costs and expenses
which were paid by Whitcom in connection
with the U.S. Financial Incorporated litigations and which amount was billed to but not
paid by Smith, plus interest on the above amount commencing, with respect to each portion of such amount,, on the thirty first day
after the date of the first bill demanding
payment of such portion and running until
full payment is made. The rate of interest
shall be the traditional rate on money due
and owing on a contract which is silent with
respect to interest rate, i.e. the statutory
icate .2 That rate is 6% simple interest per
annum until July 25, 1981 and 9% thereafter
until full payment is made. However, interest
on $70,000 of the total amount due and owing
by Smith shall not run subsequent to December
19, 1978 when Smith offered to pay that amount

2.

See CPLR S.5004; Jamaica Saving Bank v. Toomey, 77 Misc.2d
887, 355 N.Y.S.2d 268, aff'd, 46 A.D.2d 847 N.Y.S.2d 313
(2d Dep't 1974).

-4without prejudice to an ultimate determination of the rights and liabilities of the
parties.
I direct that the parties and/or their counsel
work out the mathematical computations necessary to determine the precise amount due and
owing by Smith to Whitcom pursuant to this
Award. I shall retain jurisdiction over this
matter to decide any dispute on these computations which the parties cannot resolve.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 12, 1982
STATE OF New York )
' ce
COUNTY OF New York ) ''
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

